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INTRODUCTION
If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that
would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many
have begun to call the "positive turn" in originalism. Defenses of originalism in
this vein are "positive" in that they are based on the status of the Constitution,
and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from
abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses
instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On
these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law:
that we regard the framers' law, and any other further lawful changes, as our law
today. If we do not, originalism is not the law and perhaps should be abandoned
in favor of what is.
The positive turn points in the right direction but, we argue, does not go far
enough. To be sound and complete, a positive-law argument for constitutional
originalism must also have firm conceptual and normative grounds. Without
conceptual and normative anchors, positive-law originalism is subject to drift in
a jurisprudential sea in which "whatever is, is law." An appropriately anchored
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theory depends on a defensible concept of the Constitution as positive law to
justify a normative conclusion about how faithful participants in our legal
system ought to interpret it in developing constitutional law. This Article
explains how the classical natural law tradition of legal thought, which is also
the framers' tradition, supplies a solid jurisprudential foundation for constitu-
tional originalism in our law today.
The particular type of constitutional originalism we propose understands the
Constitution as enduring original law that remains fixed and authoritative until
lawfully changed. Because the Constitution is law, its adoption into our legal
order gave rise to new law. This original law of the Constitution consisted of all
the propositions of law that became valid by virtue of the addition of the
Constitution to the rest of the law then in effect. The form of constitutional
originalism that we argue for, then, is a form of "original-law originalism," or
what might be called enduring original-law-ism. 2
Like the arguments supplied by positive-turn theorists Stephen Sachs and
William Baude, we offer positive-law-based arguments for constitutional origi-
nalism. Unlike them, we do so by confronting, rather than by claiming, legal
positivism. The result is an approach that flips on its head the conventional
understanding of the contribution of natural-law reasoning to constitutionalism.
In constitutional interpretation, the primary function of natural law is not to
supplement positive-law reasoning. It is to underwrite the moral obligation of
interpreters to treat the enacted Constitution as positive law. 3
The starting point for the classical natural law tradition in thinking about
positive law is the recognition that there are certain human goods that human
positive law alone can provide. On many important questions facing our
political community, practical reasoning alone underdetermines how we
ought to proceed. Accordingly, there is a need for authoritative resolution to
1. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 817
(2015) (defining and defending "original-law originalism").
2. When Steve Smith shifted from defending a version of original meaning originalism to what he
calls "original decision originalism," Michael Rappaport commented that it reminded him of C.S.
Peirce's shift from "pragmatism" to "pragmaticism." Michael Rappaport, Between the Original Deci-
sion and Abstract Originalism: An Unbiased Approach to Original Meaning, ONLINE LIBR. L. &
LIBERTY (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/between-the-original-decision-and-
abstract-originalism-an-unbiased-approach-to-original-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/3E2E-C5QD]. Peirce
made this shift to distance his approach from other pragmatist approaches by using a term that was
"ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." See Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, 15 MONIST
161, 165-66 (1905) ("[T]he writer, finding his bantling 'pragmatism' so promoted, feels that it is time
to kiss his child good-by [sic] and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose
of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism,' which is
ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers."). We are not so cantankerous. In coining "original-law-ism,"
we aim simply to highlight a particular form of constitutional originalism that treats the Constitution as
enduring original law. The term is too unwieldy to use consistently, and original-law originalism does
just as well, provided it is understood in the terms set forth in this paper. We therefore only deploy it
occasionally, when doing so emphasizes what might otherwise be missed if we were to use the broader
term "originalism" instead.
3. See infra Section II.A.
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proceed one way or another in bringing about certain human goods in society.
Law supplies one such authoritative resolution that going forward will settle
something that would otherwise have been unsettled.
Law's authoritative settlement function can provide for social coordination,
facilitate cooperation, and peacefully and reasonably resolve disputes. Because
of law's contribution to the common good and human flourishing, practically
reasonable citizens and officials should support a reasonably just legal system
and adopt a strong, presumptive moral obligation to respect the authority of
positive law in a reasonably just legal system. This is so even if the structure of
the system or a particular output strikes one as imperfect. Absent an obligation
to honor positive law, the community and persons cannot enjoy the benefits of a
reasonably just legal system.
The written Constitution of the United States, as stipulated positive law, is an
authoritative settlement necessary for the common good. Its provisions, which
create institutions of government and set forth norms constituting and governing
those institutions, specify the framework by which our particular legal system
will operate. In order for this Constitution to accomplish as positive law what it
purports to do as positive law, the decisions it reflects must be durable until
changed on the terms the Constitution provides or the legal system ordered by
the Constitution ends. An approach to the Constitution as law that does not treat
the Constitution's legal determinations as fixed and authoritative jeopardizes the
benefits this particular positive law offers our community.
Thus, to grasp those legal determinations and reap the benefits of that positive
law, we need to identify and apply the rules, principles, and understandings that
formed and informed the Constitution's structure and provisions at their origins.
This is not because our Constitution is perfectly just, nor is it because our
Constitution just is. Rather, it is because the positive content of our Constitution
is sufficiently just to merit our moral obligation to its authority. Practical reason
underdetermines which of the many reasonable permutations of constitutional
orders a polity should adopt, but once such a regime becomes positive law, we
have strong reasons to understand and defer to that authoritative decision. This
argument is both "positive" and "normative," in the sense that Baude and Sachs
use these terms.4 This defense of originalism, or original-law-ism, is an argu-
ment from the moral point or purposes of our written Constitution's positivity.
Constitutional originalism justified on these grounds captures what is true and
valuable about the positive turn while providing the normative foundation that
makes originalism worth defending. This classical understanding about the
nature and purpose of a constitution is continuous with the founding genera-
tion's conceptions and with many contemporary judicial articulations of the
criteria that justify particular methods of constitutional interpretation. On our
4. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2349, 2353 (2015) (describing
his theory as a "positive account" of originalism); Sachs, supra note 1, at 823 (describing "normative"
defenses of originalism).
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approach, originalism stands even if many legal participants reject originalism
or merely pay lip service to it. What is decisive is the point of view of the
morally reasonable person toward the social fact of our stipulated positive-law
Constitution-not social facts about what today's legal officials happen to
believe about interpretive method. And the practically reasonable person's
attitude toward our Constitution, we argue, should be originalist.
In conclusion, originalism will never die as long as the written Constitution
remains understood as the kind of positive law it purports to be-an authorita-
tive text that fixes binding rules of law for our society. This is not living
originalism, 5 but enduring originalism. Our constitutional law ought to be
applied in an originalist way as long as the framers' Constitution remains
accepted by us as the kind of written positive law the framing generations
authoritatively made in order to secure for our society the human goods that
they sought to secure for theirs. If we are not applying the Constitution as
positive law now as they did then, then we must face up to that fact and
abandon the claim of constitutional continuity.
A brief note on the scope and aims of this Article and the nature of our
project more generally. We are natural lawyers who are also originalists; more
precisely, we are originalists because we are natural lawyers. We hope to
introduce originalists to the promise of the natural law tradition, first by
intervening in jurisprudential arguments about how to understand the Constitu-
tion as law. We argue that the natural law tradition of theorizing, with its
emphasis on the moral purposes of law, provides the best framework for
choosing and justifying any interpretive theory, legal or otherwise.6 Beyond this
broader methodological point, a second aim of this Article is to begin sketching
a natural-law theory of originalist constitutional interpretation and identifying
the possible challenges to implementing such a theory today. Overall, we argue
that the classical natural law tradition itself provides the strongest theoretical
scaffolding for the rule-of-law intuitions that draw many people to originalist
interpretation in the first place. We also hope to emphasize to natural lawyers
who are hostile to originalism that the classical tradition has much to say about
the moral importance of human law's positivity and fixity, as well as the
interpreter's humility when confronting such posited law.
A complete argument about how natural law theory points toward originalism
would have to be more detailed than we can offer in this Article. The same
holds for a complete theory of constitutional adjudication. Scholarly prudence
might counsel for silence on such matters until we write the separate articles
they deserve, but we are forging ahead with these partial promissory notes
nonetheless. The plausibility of our message to originalists and constitutional
5. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
6. Cf Richard H. Fallon Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535 (1999).
7. For such an argument in statutory interpretation, see RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE
INTENT (2012).
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theorists more generally depends on seeing at least the outlines of what a more
complete theory would look like. We plan to fill out the theory in future work
and hope others will do so as well. For now, however, we are satisfied to lay out
an agenda for a line of constitutional theory that we think can be fruitful, yet
remains untilled.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the positive turn in original-
ism, one of the most important and promising developments in originalist
theory in recent years. After noting the approach's benefits, we offer jurispruden-
tial objections to its foundations. Part II explains how the positive turn's
appealing form of originalism is better grounded in a broader understanding of
the moral point of constitutions. Far from being a musty, sectarian artifact, the
classical natural law tradition of reasoning about positive law's moral purpose
animated the framers' understanding of our Constitution and provides the most
persuasive reason for continued adherence to that original law today. Part III
addresses the difficulties that today's nonoriginalist practices present to one
normatively committed to original law, while also explaining why the appeal of
originalism endures in the face of those challenges.
I. THE POSITIVE TURN AND ITS DRAWBACKS
Arguments advocating originalism tend to come in normative or conceptual
terms." On normative grounds, many originalists claim that it is good, as a
matter of political morality, for courts to be originalist. This could be because
originalism reins in platonic guardians, 9 promotes popular sovereignty,o maxi-
mizes liberty," or is good rule-consequentialism. 1 2 Others argue, on conceptual
grounds, that a proper philosophical understanding of legal authority or interpre-
tation entails an originalist methodology. 13 The standard debate thus suggests
that one could take or leave originalism based on one's normative commitments
or understanding about the nature of legal interpretation.
Normative and conceptual arguments are fraught and seemingly interminable.
But what if our law told us how to understand the Constitution as law? That
8. We borrow this helpful typology (and some of the examples) from Sachs, supra note 1, at 822-23.
9. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
10. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 154-55 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444-46 (2007).
11. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
89-117 (2004); Ilya Somin, How Constitutional Originalism Promotes Liberty, ONLINE LIBR. L. &
LIBERTY (June 1, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/how-constitutional-originalism-
promotes-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/JB2Z-RPNW].
12. See, e.g., JOHN 0. McGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION
2 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013);
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42, 42-43 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
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would be a nifty thing. One of law's signal features, after all, is its promise to
resolve questions that divide reasonable people.1 4 So if there is law on how to
understand the Constitution as law, it would be good to find and follow it. The
promise of rooting originalism in the law has generated a growing body of
literature in favor of a positive turn for originalism.1 5 The turn is "positive"
because its advocates seek to ground originalism in posited sources of law and
because they embrace the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart in understanding what
counts as our law.1 6
This Part explores the positive turn's virtues and its limits. The positive turn
promises a major step in the right direction but is held back by its jurispruden-
tial baggage. The turn's emphasis on the Constitution as positive law, its focus
on the arguments and internal commitments of those participating in that
system, and its jurisprudential clarity are all virtues. Yet, by limiting itself to
neutral description, it is unable to sort out conflicting arguments about the
character of constitutional law or give any compelling reason to persist with any
consensus that in fact exists. For positive law originalism to answer serious
theoretical and empirical objections, it needs more robust and more conceptu-
ally normative resources than Hart's descriptive legal positivism.
A. ORIGINALISM AS THE LAW
The positive turn seeks to reorient the basic questions animating originalism.
Rather than asking what the text of the Constitution originally said or meant, the
positive-law originalist wants to know what the Constitution's "enactment
originally did, as a matter of Founding-era law." 1 7 The answer to this latter
question, it is said, will give us the best reasons to be (or not be) constitutional
originalists.
Professor Stephen Sachs lays a foundation for this approach in his article
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change. Sachs contends that originalist
theorists have been putting the theoretical cart before the legal horse. It may be
true that originalism restrains judges, promotes popular sovereignty, protects
liberty, leads to good consequences, and advances other human goods. But,
Sachs asks, even if that is so, what if the actual, historical law that our
Constitution entrenched cuts against these normative goals? Originalism would
14. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE
DILEMMAS OF LAW 26 (2001) (Law is desirable because "a community must have a mechanism for
authoritatively settling disagreements and uncertainties over what is to be done").
15. See William Baude, Originalism and the Positive Turn, ONLINE LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 12,
2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/originalism-and-the-positive-turn/ [https://perma.cc/
3X2G-JLPL].
16. See Baude, supra note 4; Sachs, supra note 1, at 835-36; Stephen E. Sachs, The "Constitution in
Exile" as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253 (2014). See generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958).
17. Sachs, supra note 1, at 874.
18. Sachs, supra note 1.
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start to resemble the law reform projects-the dreaded constitutional activism-
that original originalists decried in the first place.19 Sachs similarly challenges
conceptualists who claim that a proper theory of interpretation demands original-
ism. Nothing precludes the Constitution as law from demanding a different
approach to the document.2 0
The true originalist, on this account, treats the framers' law-the law that the
Constitution established-together with lawful changes that have occurred since
the Founding, as our constitutional law. 2 1 The framers' law includes the text of
the Constitution and contemporaneous, accepted "'interpretative rules' . . . for
converting those texts into law." 2 2 The shape of those interpretive keys, and the
consequent, substantive constitutional law they unlock, are a matter of historical
inquiry, not theoretical argument.2 3 Happily for the bench and bar, it is a
historical inquiry suitable for practicing lawyers: just as one today may deter-
mine the validity of title to Blackacre by applying rules of property in eigh-
teenth century Virginia, we would seek to understand the interpretive rules of
Founding Era public lawyers.t We may or may not like what we discover in
that search, but fidelity to the law, not some judge's or philosopher's pet theory,
is what the originalist enterprise is all about.
That is not to say Sachs's account is antiphilosophical. Rather, he hitches
originalism to the wagon of Hart's legal positivism, which claims that identify-
ing "the law" is a matter of identifying social facts, not moral evaluation.2 5 The
relevant social facts for the Hartian positivist are the beliefs of faithful partici-
pants in the legal system about which social rules count as binding law.2 6 In
Hartian argot, this master, second-order rule about what norms count as law is
the "rule of recognition."2 7 The faithful participants in the legal system need not
feel a moral obligation to the rule of recognition and its results, though some
19. Id. at 823-28. Neither "Old Originalists" like Robert Bork and Raoul Berger, nor "New
Originalists" like Larry Solum and Keith Whittington, should be confused with The New Originals,
who were an early instantiation of the fictional band Spinal Tap. See THIS Is SPINAL TAP (20th Century
Fox 1984) ("Well, there was another group, in the east end, called the Originals and we had to rename
ourselves.").
20. Sachs, supra note 1, at 828-35.
21. Id. at 874.
22. Id. at 875.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 887-88; cf NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (1997) ("A London barrister of 1540, quick-frozen and revived in
New York today, would only need a year's brush-up course at NYU School of Law to begin civil
practice as a partner in a midtown or Wall Street corporate-law firm.").
25. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 825 (citing Hart's intellectual inheritors such as Leslie Green, Brian
Leiter, and Scott Shapiro); Sachs, supra note 16, at 2261-68 (adopting a Hartian framework for his
approach to constitutional theory).
26. HAR, supra note 16, at 88-91; Sachs, supra note 1, at 837 ("Fully understanding the law means
trying on the 'internal' perspective of a faithful participant in the system."). For a thoughtful discussion
on the internal point of view in Hart's positivism, see Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn
in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REv. 167 (1999).
27. See HAR, supra note 16, at 94-95.
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might; 28 they need only share a social convention about which norms are valid,
binding law such that compliance is a basis for public justification and departure
a basis for criticism. 29 The legal theorist's job in search of the law of a
particular system is identifying and describing those internal beliefs, not evaluat-
ing them.
Rephrased in Hartian terms, Sachs's originalism seeks to identify and de-
scribe the internal perspective of faithful participants in the legal system at the
time of the Founding. Then we can understand, without normative argument or
conceptual quibbling, what the Constitution did as a matter of law. If Hart
understood his jurisprudential project as one of "descriptive sociology," 30 then
Sachs conceives of originalism as fidelity to the fruits of descriptive, doctrinal
history.
Thus, an originalist seeks to understand, through the lens of Founding Era
interpretive legal rules, the law the Constitution contributed to our legal system.
It is possible that this originalist inquiry could discover that Founding Era law
did not want interpreters to focus on original intent, public meaning, or ex-
pected application, but rather elaborate a living or common law constitution.3 1
Should one do the historical spadework to unearth such a bullet, an original-law
originalist would be willing to bite it. 3 2 The Founding Era's rule of recognition
about the content of constitutional law is a social fact or practice one searches
for and applies, not something for an originalist lawyer to critique.33
But this Hartian shift opens originalism to a deeper challenge. Much of
today's constitutional doctrine and practice does not prioritize identifying and
adhering to the framers' law. If so, and if social practice determines the content
of positive law, then a positivist inquiry into interpretive method could refute
originalism as our law today.34 Maybe originalism once was the law, but what if
our rule of recognition has changed? Cognizant of that worry, Sachs offers an
argument about why it is "plausible" to conclude that practices today still point
toward original-law originalism. 35 Professor William Baude's work in Is Origi-
nalism Our Law? offers a more exhaustive argument in defense of that
28. See id. at 203.
29. See id. at 90.
30. Id. at vi ("Notwithstanding its concern with analysis [The Concept of Law] may also be regarded
as an essay in descriptive sociology . . . .").
31. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885
(1985) (exploring this question); cf Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated if procedure "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
32. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 880.
33. See id. at 858 ("Why be more 'originalist' than the Founders, or more Catholic than the Pope?").
34. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 193 (Matthew D. Adler &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the
Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1107 (2008).
35. Sachs, supra note 1, at 864-74 (describing such practices).
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very proposition.36
Baude argues for a form of originalism that is at the heart of constitutional
practice's rule of recognition. This "inclusive originalism" holds that "the
original meaning of the Constitution is the ultimate criterion for constitutional
law, including of the validity of other methods of interpretation or decision." 3 7
This contrasts with an "exclusive originalism," which treats original meaning as
the sole, legitimate criterion for constitutional interpretation.3 8 It also contrasts
with a "weak" originalism in which original meaning is a source of constitu-
tional law, but does not sit atop the interpretive hierarchy. 3 9 Inclusive original-
ism dovetails with Sachs's original-law originalism: if the law of the Founding
included, for example, respect for nonoriginalist precedent or warrant for
nonoriginalist interpretation, then application of those methods would, ulti-
mately, be originalist.
Baude argues that inclusive originalism is our law as a matter of social fact
and contemporary practice. 4 0 As a Hartian positivist like Sachs, Baude under-
stands that his case rises and falls on empirical facts about our rule of recogni-
tion today. He marshals two kinds of evidence to support his claim about
American constitutional practice. 41 First, he points to "higher-order practices"
in our legal culture that support an ultimate commitment to originalism. 42 We
attribute great authority to the framers by treating the Constitution they drafted
as binding law and nobody credibly claims that we have gone through an
extralegal revolution since ratification. 4 3 Similarly, because of the Constitution's
commands, we treat many questions of governing structure ("Who is the
President? Who is in Congress? Who is on the Supreme Court?") as easy
questions resolved by legal authority, even though as a matter of first principles
they are hardly straightforward.t
Second, Baude sees inclusive originalism structuring "lower-order," everyday
practices of courts. Focusing on the Supreme Court in particular, Baude states
that whenever there is a conflict between original meaning and other sources of
meaning, the Court goes with original meaning.4 6 When there is no such
conflict, Baude continues, the Court never repudiates originalism.47 Baude then
argues that even cases in today's putatively antioriginalist canon are consistent
36. Baude, supra note 4.
37. Id., at 2355.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2464-65.
41. Baude, supra note 4, at 2365.
42. Id. at 2365-70.
43. Id. at 2365-67.
44. Id. at 2367-69.
45. Id. at 2370-86.
46. Baude, supra note 4, at 2372-76 (analyzing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)).
47. Id. at 2376-86.
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with these lower level, ultimate originalist practices.48
But what if Baude is wrong on the facts? This is no place to quibble with his
descriptive doctrinal sociology,4 9 but even if the Supreme Court's contemporary
legal outputs were far less consistent with inclusive originalism than Baude
believes, that need not doom the positive turn. To understand this, we need a
return to Hart's internal point of view as applied to constitutional law. Hart's
legal positivism emphasizes that the internal commitments of relevant legal
actors are the critical social facts in determining the criteria for legal validity in
a system.5 0 Because it is also possible for people to act contrary to their higher
order beliefs, the particular outputs of a legal system may not always cohere
with higher order structures of justification.
Sachs leverages this insight to argue that, even if many contemporary deci-
sions of the Supreme Court are inconsistent with originalism, originalism can
still be our law if the shared, higher order justifications the Court invokes are in
fact originalist.52 This is because for positivists like Hart, "it matters what we
tell ourselves, not just what we do on the ground." 5 3 The ultimate law is this set
of shared legal principles, not the potentially erroneous applications of those
principles in practice. Even if a stream of doctrinal results seems to place
originalism "in exile," that departure is more apparent than real, so long as our
overarching structures of justifying interpretive method do not repudiate original-
law originalism. In that case, like Duke Vincentio in Shakespeare's Measure for
Measure, the master has not left the city so much as hidden in plain sight.
All told, whether one calls it "original law originalism," like Sachs,5 4 or
"inclusive originalism," like Baude,5 5 the positive turn grounds originalism in a
commitment to the positive law established by the Founding and any lawful
changes pursuant to that law. This originalism includes interpretive rules about
how to translate constitutional text into law. Only when we grasp this original
law as an empirical matter will we know what the particular forms and further
goals of constitutional interpretation should be. The positive turn further argues
it is plausible to understand originalism as our law today, at least at the level of
second-order commitments if not the actual outputs of constitutional doctrine.
As its advocates concede, positivist originalism is contingent on the social facts
48. Id. (analyzing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1996), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Home Bldg. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
49. Cf HARr, supra note 16, at vi (describing jurisprudence as "descriptive sociology").
50. See id. at 89 (contrasting the "internal" and "external" aspects of rules).
51. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 837-38 ("Sometimes our accepted arguments and our accepted
conclusions might point in different directions.").
52. See Sachs, supra note 16, at 2261 ("Because our day-to-day practices and deeper principles can
diverge, there's room for originalists and other out-of-power theorists to use the latter to critique the
former.").
53. Id. at 2265.
54. Sachs, supra note 1, at 874-75.
55. Baude, supra note 4, at 2354-63.
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concerning our law and our legal commitments. If originalism is not the law, the
legal theorist has nothing to say, or at least nothing distinctively legal to say,
about those facts.
This positive turn has many positives. It is good for constitutional lawyers,
who are lawyers after all, to focus on the positive content of the Constitution,
both with respect to its explicit text and its unwritten legal backdrops. 6 Only
then can we understand what kind of positive law our constitutional order has.
Some of the unease about originalism's flights of theoretical abstraction in
recent years may flow from the sense that an enterprise once dedicated to
finding the law has been colonized by political and linguistic philosophers.
The positive turn brings originalism back within the mere lawyer's bailiwick.
But our praise for the positive turn is not inspired by a yearning for simple,
pretheoretical days of constitutional interpretation. Quite the contrary, constitu-
tional law and scholarship has no shortage of theory, but it too often lacks rigor
with respect to first principles. And here the positive turn is refreshing. Whether
or not Sachs and Baude have a winning hand, they lay their jurisprudential
cards on the table for examination: they are originalists because they are
positivists and believe that, in our system, positivism points towards original-
ism. Others, of course, think positivism points away from originalism.5" Others
reject positivism. 5 9 Irrespective of this disagreement, the positive turn offers
both a theory of constitutional law and a jurisprudential justification. Such
clarity reduces the chance that disputants will talk past each other and it
encourages interlocutors to focus on jurisprudential commitments that too often
go unexamined and undefended. This theoretical development also focuses
resolutely and, we think, properly on the positive law the Constitution brought
into being.
B. THE LIMITS OF THE POSITIVE TURN
The positive turn heads in the right direction, but it is open to serious
objections. First, one could argue that its defenders are wrong in describing our
constitutional law as originalist. Second, one could concede that the positive
turn tracks the Supreme Court's opinions on their face, but that the Court's
expressions are insincere or mask a more complex set of nonoriginalist practices
and beliefs. Third, perhaps the positive turn defines originalism too broadly: if
all that counts is not being formally inconsistent with or openly repudiating
original law, originalism may lose its critical bite. If Home Building & Loan v.
Blaisdell; Gideon v. Wainwright; Miranda v. Arizona; Lawrence v. Texas; Roe v.
Wade-and more recently, Obergefell v. Hodges and Arizona State Legislature-
56. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1813 (2012).
57. For such a worry, see Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 223.
58. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 34; Fallon, supra note 34.
59. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2087 (2001).
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are as originalist as District of Columbia v. Heller; Crawford v. Washington; and
Blakely v. Washington,6 0 then it is unclear whether originalism so-theorized
alone does anything worth arguing over. The positive turn's conception of
originalism may recall the religious apologist who modifies her conception of
the divine to keep pace with discoveries of modern science.
But these are not our concerns, or at least not directly. We leave these
important arguments to others while focusing our criticism on the positive turn's
methodology, not the results of its application. The positive turn's embrace of
Hart's legal positivism opens it to serious theoretical objections that should be
interesting to those who embrace or reject originalism.
To set up our objections, it helps first to recap Hart's approach to jurispru-
dence and its use in the positive turn in originalist theory. Hart placed at the
center of his concept of law the "rule of recognition"-the master social rule or
practice that determines which social rules count as valid law in a community.62
In a functioning legal system, a critical mass of people must regard the rule of
recognition as a source of internal obligation, not just something they are
obliged to comply with because of threat of sanctions. In other words, Hart
cares about the "internal point of view" participants in the practice have toward
63the rule of recognition. A theorist can identify and explain these crucial legal
concepts without evaluating them, hence Hart's positivist separation of law
from morality. 64
Hart asked, "What is law?" as opposed to what morality, custom, or other
social norms say law should be. Advocates of the positive turn in originalism
use Hart's method to answer the narrower question, "What is our law of
constitutional interpretation?" as opposed to what ideal political theory or
beliefs about the nature of interpretation say that law ought to be. Sachs and
Baude thus argue that the best reason to be an originalist is if originalism is part
of our system's rule of recognition. 5 Adopting Hart's positivism, they argue
that originalism can be established as the law through neutral, descriptive
argument about our legal practices. Just as one can identify contributory negli-
gence as the law of Virginia without evaluating whether it is superior to
comparative fault, 6 one should review our Constitution and law reports to see
60. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Baude, supra note 4, at 2376-86 (discussing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1996), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and
Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
61. Cf C.A. COULSON, SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF 20 (1955) ("There is no 'God of the gaps' to
take over at those strategic places where science fails; and the reason is that gaps of this sort have the
unpreventable habit of shrinking.").
62. See HAR, supra note 16, at 94-95.
63. Id. at 98-99.
64. See id. at 203.
65. See supra Section I.A.
66. See, e.g., Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 677 S.E.2d 272, 275 (Va. 2009).
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whether, as a matter of fact, originalism is part of the law. If it is, then
originalism is the law and we should be originalists.
Our primary problem with the positive turn is its attempt, like Hart's, to
separate description from evaluation in legal theory. This move is based on a
flawed approach to theorizing human practices like law. At worst, it results in a
partial and misleading view of a practice. At best, it can offer a normatively
inert summary of how people happen to do things, but it offers no reason for
why people do these things or should continue to do so, which is an unfortunate
thing for an approach that seeks to justify the practice it studies.
1. Describing the Law of Interpretation Normatively
We object to the usefulness, if not impossibility, of jurisprudence that is
solely descriptive. Our claim is not that it is impossible to describe aspects of
something like interpretive practice in a neutral fashion. Rather it is that
reportage alone cannot lead to understanding complex social phenomena, espe-
cially one that claims authority like law.6 7
There are many varieties of this objection,6" but we will focus on one put
forward by Professor John Finnis, whose philosophy of the social sciences
strikes us as the most sound.6 9 Even if neutral description of empirical facts
alone were sufficient for seeking understanding in the natural sciences, and
there is reason to believe it is not,'0 it is particularly wanting for theorizing
about human practices like law. Unlike water, fruit flies, or comets, law is a
human creation. This has important implications for investigation. First, it is
unlikely to have the undifferentiated regularity of natural objects of study like
carbon. Second, an essential part of understanding such a practice is the purpose
for doing it in the first place. True, one cannot understand things like law
without having seen examples of it. But a more complete understanding that
67. Cf 4 JOHN FINNIS, Describing Law Normatively, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 23
(2011).
68. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1-44 (1986); Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and
Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 97 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995). For more general doubts about the utility of conceptual analysis of law by Hart or
anyone else, see Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism,
31 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 663 (2011).
69. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (2d ed. 2011) (relying on Aristotle's
and Max Weber's approaches to studies of human affairs). We reject the reductive naturalism of
theorists like Leiter, supra note 68, and worry that deeply interpretive approaches like Dworkin's, see,
e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1982), overstate the undoubtedly
important place of judicial discourse and theory. Cf Ian Shapiro & Alexander Wendt, The Difference
that Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent, in IAN SHAPIRO, THE FLIGHT FROM
REALITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 19, 38-39 (2005) (stating that philosophical realists "agree with
interpretivists that there is no theory-neutral observation," but "[u]nlike interpretivists, realists contend
that well-established theories do refer to, and are constrained by, external reality" beyond participants'
practices and discourses).
70. See, e.g., Roy BHASKAR, A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE (Routledge 2008) (1975); MICHAEL
POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (corrected ed. 1962); Shapiro &
Wendt, supra note 69, at 38-41.
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draws on and extrapolates from the variety of its instantiations must be an-
chored in the practical point of the activity.7 1
To be more concrete, if you want to understand a social phenomenon-say
"the law of constitutional interpretation"-one might tally a list of things that
people label "constitutional interpretation." In any complex situation, however,
one finds a motley assembly or at least gradations of difference. Justices Scalia
and Breyer-not to mention members of the Executive Branch, Congress, or
internet comment sections-are hardly univocal in their approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation. Although Hartian constitutional theory properly seeks to
understand a practice in light of the views of the practitioners, it does not and
cannot tell us whose internal point of view is most important. Is it the corrupt or
biased judge, the unreflective jurist, the advocate of active liberty, the faint-
hearted originalist, the pragmatist overcoming law, the original-law originalist,
or the restorer of the lost constitution? In any situation of variety, there remains
the question of whose internal point of view is primary.
Accordingly, if an account of any complex social practice is to be more than a
seriatim listing of usages-a glorified casebook without analytical notes-a
theorist has to choose more discriminating selection criteria.72 And, because
things like law and interpretive practices are human creations, a sensible way to
sort the data is to do so in light of the point of creating such things in the first
place. 7 3 To take an extreme example, consider a judge who thinks the Constitu-
tion and Federalist papers are written in a secret code that she has unlocked.7 4 A
judge resolving cases in that method is in a sense engaging in the project of
constitutional interpretation. So also, to use far less extreme examples, were the
majorities in cases that make up the so-called anticanon of disfavored cases.
Now compare these flawed instances of interpretation with your favorite exem-
plars of constitutional reasoning. ("Now that's what I call constitutional interpre-
tation!") What separates them will, in large part, turn on your understanding
about the point and nature of the Constitution and the implications those
71. See FINNIS, supra note 69, at 3; Eric Voegelin, The Theory of Legal Science: A Review, 4 LA. L.
REv. 554, 563 (1942); Gr6goire Webber, Asking Why in the Study of Human Affairs, 60 AM. J. JURIS. 51
(2015).
72. FINNis, supra note 69, at 4 (without such criteria, the legal theorist is left with "a juxtaposition of
all lexicographies conjoined with all local histories").
73. Id. at 3; Webber, supra note 71, at 54 ("The study of ... human conduct ... is the study of the
action's point, purpose, goal, value, objective .... ); cf Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the
Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1998) ("We can determine the method to
interpret the Constitution only if we are first clear about why the Constitution is authoritative.").
74. Cf Doron Witztum, Eliyahu Rips & Yoav Rosenberg, Equidistant Letter Sequences in the Book
of Genesis, 9 STAT. Sn. 429 (1994).
75. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (discussing Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). The anticanon varies by
the theorist, of course, with originalists likely including cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 3 (1973),
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), or Home Bldg. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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judgments have on the task of applying it as law.76 And not, say, on the length
of opinion or whether the decision appears in a prime-numbered volume of the
United States Reports.
The positive turn's ostensibly empirical defense of the claim that originalism
is our law underlines the limits of description. Take the claim that Lawrence v.
Texas78 is consistent with originalism. There are multiple plausible ways to
understand that case's interpretive approach. To nonoriginalist Laurence Tribe,
it recognizes a fundamental right, even if it "dare not speak its name." 7 9 To
common-law constitutionalist David Strauss, it represents the Court's incremen-
tal use of substantive due process to invalidate unpopular legal outliers.o To an
originalist like Baude, it is consistent with inclusive originalism. 1 There are
features of the opinion that render each interpretation of the decision plausible-
the question remains which feature is critical for categorizing the opinion
and why.
Description alone cannot provide the answer. Here, the question of how the
Supreme Court interprets the Constitution is intertwined with questions about
what a constitution is, what it is for, and what the proper role for legal
interpretation is in light of the kind of law that the Constitution is. This is why
everyone excludes astrology, numerology, or the litigant's eye color as salient
explanations or data for understanding an opinion. This evaluative component
does not disappear when we shift from the implausible to the plausible character-
izations. Rather, explanations are plausible because they are connected to
colorable theories about the point of treating the Constitution as law. Theories
cannot alter the facts in the world, and facts in the world can challenge our
theories.8 2 But "without a preliminary conceptualization and thus a preliminary
set of principles of selection and relevance drawn from some practical view-
point," the life of the law is just one datum thing after another.83
76. This also holds if you have chosen your favorite examples based on the substantive outcome.
You simply believe that the primary purpose of a constitution is to do substantive justice on particular
issues. We think that is an incomplete vision of constitutionalism, see infra Part II, but it is a cogent
view.
77. Hart's theorization about the concept of law as a whole is congenial with such orientation,
though he stops short of embracing evaluation. As Finnis notes, Hart's description of law "is built up by
appealing, again and again, to the practical point of the components of the concept." FINNIS, supra note
69, at 7.
78. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
79. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas, The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
80. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 859,
885-87 (2009).
81. See Baude, supra note 4, at 2382 (arguing that Obergefell v. Hodges "seemed to pick the
originalist route" to justifying a constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
82. See FINNIs, supra note 69, at 17.
83. Id. This is not to argue that the purpose of interpretation is the only relevant consideration for a
theory. Other criteria for theory construction like simplicity, explanatory breadth, and congruence with
other beliefs must play a part. See Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L.
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2. The Positive Turn and the Problem of Inertness
The positive turn cannot identify originalism as our law if there is substantial
disagreement about the rule of recognition. Yet one might object that nose
counting can get us further than we have let on. What if, in fact, most or all of
the data supports originalism, or at least trumps competing plausible theories on
nonevaluative grounds like simplicity, breadth of explanation, and consistency
with other beliefs?8 4 This would suggest that any exceptions are, in the words of
Hart, instances of "incorrect scoring," 5 rather than official changes to the rules
of the game, and that the positive turn accurately describes our law as original-
ist." The need for evaluative criteria for understanding our law would disappear
when there is no theoretical disagreement about what the law is.
In the study of human affairs, statistical regularity alone can be misleading or
incomplete. 7 By numbers alone, one would infer that making outs was the
point of baseball, that introducing unpassed bills was the point of legislating, or
that rejection was the point of writing law review articles. We can say the same
for internal dispositions. It may be true that most people in a legal system,
including officials, follow the law out of fear of sanction or because they agree
with the law anyway-not out of a sense of Hartian obligation." It was not
obvious even to Hart, who centered his theory on the factual beliefs of a critical
mass of legal officials rather than the population as a whole, that statistical
predominance alone explained the rule of recognition and internal point of
view.89
Yet our quarrel with the positive turn is not simply about the possibility of
disagreement about theories of law within the practice, a tack Dworkin de-
ployed against Hart's descriptive jurisprudence. 90 Rather, because we think
successfully theorizing about a social phenomenon like constitutional interpreta-
tion requires grasping the point of such interpretation, a purely descriptive
REv. 1215, 1239 (2009) (identifying "[s]implicity," "[c]onsilience," and "[c]onservatism" as "three
familiar theoretical desiderata").
84. See Leiter, supra note 83, at 1239 (identifying such theoretical desiderata).
85. HAR, supra note 16, at 144.
86. See Baude, supra note 4, at 2372 ("So has the Supreme Court repudiated the scoring rule [of
originalism]? I will suggest not.").
87. See FINNIs, supra note 69, at 10 (rejecting the suggestion that "statistical frequency" is the
"relevant criterion" for determining the relevant internal point of view in a legal system).
88. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015).
89. On this, a leading contemporary positivist agrees. See John Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52
AM. J. JURIS. 1, 3 (2007) ("[N]o number of supposed counterexamples can show that a proposed
paradigm is not a paradigm. That is because a paradigm or central case is simply the case that shows
how the other cases-including those supposed counterexamples-ought to be.").
90. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 1-44. Against such claims, the positivist can either refute them
through empirical evidence or concede them. A proponent of the former would argue that there is, in
fact, no disagreement and those who claim otherwise are mistaken or mendacious, while a member of
the latter camp would admit that, in fact, it turns out there is no law on the matter of constitutional
interpretation. See Leiter, supra note 83, at 1224 (offering these options to the positivist). The advocates
of the positivist turn have adopted the former strategy.
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account cannot give a complete explanation for theoretical agreement, let alone
disagreement. Even if descriptive legal sociology can identify a unanimous,
objective "is" about our legal practices, it offers no reason for why legal
officials "ought" to maintain that practice.
Now, orthodox legal positivists say such an objection misunderstands how
they are pursuing a different project, namely the neutral description of a legal
system or concept of law.91 Whether or not the "'comprehensive normative
inertness' of legal positivism" 92 is enough in the rarified air of pure jurispru-
dence, it is hardly satisfying for the positive turn in constitutional theory.
Perhaps we can understand the positive turn as a mere exercise in the contempo-
rary history of ideas, but its partisans in fact seek to offer good reasons why one
should be originalist or not. Positivism premised on "comprehensive normative
inertness" is not an obvious starting point for such a project.
Imagine all relevant people at a given time agree that a given set of interpre-
tive conventions is part of our rule of recognition. Imagine, then, a renegade
Justice or faction decided to rebel against that set of conventions.93 The
positivist will inform those interpretive insurrectionists that, to follow the law,
judges must apply other conventions instead. Should the insurrectionist reply, "I
prefer not to," the descriptive positivist would have little to say in response.9 4 In
fact, were the insurgents to reply that on such foundational matters "all that
succeeds is success,"9 5 the positivist would have to agree. And, should the
faction convince a critical mass to change interpretive regimes, such positivists
would grant them their victory as norm entrepreneurs.
Absent something more to get from "is" to "ought," the positive turn is at
best redundant and at worst depends on a non sequitur. Even if it accurately
describes the legal practice, it does "no more than repeat ... what any compe-
tent lawyer" would say counts as valid law in a system.96 That service is
worthwhile: pretheoretical beliefs can need clarification and initial description is
necessary for any more complex inquiry about law. But without more, such
reportage does not give any, let alone "the best reason to be an originalist" or
the "best reason not to." 97 To be more than a history of Supreme Court attitudes
91. See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurispru-
dence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 29 (2003) (claiming evaluative jurisprudence "lambasts positivism for
failing to answer a question it was never asking").
92. Id. (stating that such objections reflect a "misunderstanding of ... the 'comprehensive normative
intertness' of legal positivism" (quoting John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 52 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS.
199, 203 (2000))). But see FINNIS, supra note 67, at 32-41 (responding to Leiter); Jeffrey A. Po-
janowski, Redrawing the Dividing Lines Between Natural Law and Positivism(s), 101 VA. L. REv. 1023
(2015) (identifying recent movement toward reintegrating normative evaluation within jurisprudence).
93. Cf Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1971 (2004) (arguing
that textualists were trying to mount such a change in statutory interpretation).
94. See Herman Melville, Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street, in THE PIAZZA TALES 81, 107
(New York, Dix, Edwards, & Co. 1856) ("Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!").
95. HAR, supra note 16, at 153.
96. John Finnis, On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1597, 1611 (2000).
97. Sachs, supra note 1, at 822 (emphasis added).
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and practices, the positive turn needs an account of why legal officials and
citizens should treat these attitudes and resulting norms as having authoritative
force on their consciences.9 8
Aware of such a worry, Baude argues that it matters that originalism is our
law because of "the widely accepted judicial duty to obey the law." 99 Of course,
standard legal positivism does not claim to establish even a prima facie duty to
obey the law.100 Hart is content to note that participants believe law imposes
freestanding normative obligations without offering such a moral endorse-
ment.o Baude seems willing to go an inch further, conceding that he offers a
"normative argument," albeit one "more broadly accepted" than other norma-
tive defenses of originalism. 10 2 In a brief passage, Baude grounds that obliga-
tion in the judicial oath to apply the law and the claim that judicial power is
justified as a matter of democratic theory only if judges have a duty to obey the
law. 103
Even then, these arguments offer an unsatisfactorily thin theory of obligation.
Bracketing the notion that law has freestanding moral force, Baude's justifica-
tion rests in substantial part on the requirement that judges take an oath to
uphold "'this Constitution' at the time of the oath," thus rendering "the moral
content of the constitutional promise" a "positive question" of fact. 10 4 If legal
insurrectionists take liberties with the oath or depart from the rule of recognition
without rebuke, the positive turn by its terms has nothing to say about the new
present political practices. Such a possibility is not idle. Unless oath theorists
can establish no change in interpretive practice over time, it seems any shift of
interpretive method entails either (a) a violation of the oath by one or more
Justices or (b) an understanding of the oath at a very high level of generality.
The former is counterintuitive. The latter possibility defangs the theory, espe-
cially if the vision of the Constitution is a contested one. Furthermore, other
established norms of political morality compete with the duty to follow posited
law in each case. Just as stare decisis on high courts is not an inexorable
command, the second-order considerations supporting methodological fidelity
may yield to other competing concerns. Sorting out these conflicting obligations
requires more than a description of one of the popular, competing norms.
98. Finnis, supra note 96, at 1611 ("[Positivism] cannot explain the authoritativeness, for an
official's or a private citizen's conscience . . . of these alleged and imposed requirements, nor their lack
of such authority when radically unjust.").
99. Baude, supra note 4, at 2392.
100. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 101-02 (1986).
101. See Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1613, 1618-19 (2000); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Legal Thought in Enlightenment's
Wake, 4 JURISPRUDENCE 158, 165 (2013) (book review).
102. Baude, supra note 4, at 2392; see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 886 ("Following the law is what
judges are supposed to do.").
103. Baude, supra note 4, at 2392-95. For an excellent articulation of the oath theory, see Richard
M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 Nw. U. L. REv. 299 (2016).
104. Baude, supra note 4, at 2394.
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Thus, even in the positive turn's sparse ("comprehensive[1y] ... inert[]"?1 0 5 )
normative theory, it appears that the only thing that would succeed is success. A
more satisfying theory would move beyond stipulation and explore why it is
reasonable (or not) that many presently expect judges to honor the law. Know-
ing those reasons could help negotiate conflicts between rule-of-law values and
other popular, higher order obligations. It will also give a full range of reasons
and practical guidance to legal officials deciding whether and why to follow an
existing interpretive methodology. The social facts the positive turn identifies
will be crucial, even if they are not sufficient to tell a court how to interpret the
Constitution. Only by connecting social facts with the practical purposes of law
can one discover "the best reason to be an originalist" or the "best reason not
to."106
Advocates of the positive turn have a choice. They can, like Hart and his
heirs, limit themselves to descriptions about others' beliefs. If so, their theory
gives no reason to be an originalist (or not). Or they can admit that the practical
relevance of their description relies on normative considerations. In that case,
there is much more work to do to ground and elaborate the nature and scope of
the legal obligation that points toward (or away from) originalism.
C. THE REMAINING JURISPRUDENTIAL TASK
Notwithstanding these questions, the positive turn raises a promising possibil-
ity: that one should be an originalist because that is what our law requires. This
new movement in constitutional theory has much to recommend it. It takes
seriously the notion that second-order practices and commitments like interpre-
tive rules and principles can have legal, or at least law-like, authority absent
formal legislative promulgation. Like Hart, positive-turn theorists also take
seriously the participants' beliefs about legal obligation, not just external pat-
terns of behavior.
The positive turn is incomplete, however, if it is merely the positivist turn. It
is hard to establish that originalism is in fact the master interpretive convention
in a univocal rule of recognition that all relevant practitioners regard as obliga-
tory. This is not just because the Supreme Court often does not appear to act or
think in originalist fashion. It is also because social institutions like human
law-especially the uncodified metalaw of interpretation-are open systems
that rarely display the regularity of the laws of natural sciences.10 7 A jurispruden-
tial justification for an interpretive method needs to resolve the question of
whose internal point of view matters. Positivism, by its terms, would not be able
to answer that question and would have to concede there is just no law of
interpretation.
105. Cf John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 52 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 203 (2000).
106. Sachs, supra note 1, at 822.
107. Cf. ANDREW SAYER, REALISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 (1999).
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Even if constitutional positivists can adduce evidence of univocal originalism
without evaluation, their description alone cannot tell anyone why they should
be an originalist or not. Positivist jurisprudence, by its terms, seeks to tell you
what the law is, but pointedly says nothing about whether, when, or why you
ought to obey it.108 But most constitutional positivists seem interested in
speaking to lawyers and judges about how they ought to interpret the law. 109
Accordingly, a complete jurisprudential theory would give nonempirical reasons
about why the empirical facts the positivists have discovered matter. It must
resolve the question of why obey a rule of recognition. The positivist project
seeks comprehensive normative inertness and is not interested in that question.
A jurisprudential justification for originalism as an approach to finding the
law needs to not only gather the data, but make sense of it-and even critique
it-through the lens of a theory. To understand the importance of positivity-the
need for human-created law despite its imperfections-we must go beyond
positivism in theorizing about constitutional interpretation. 1 0 The classical
natural law tradition, misunderstood by modern constitutional theorists when it
is not ignored, can answer the central questions on which positivism is deliber-
ately mute.
II. CLASSICAL NATURAL LAw FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE ORIGINALISM
Like "legal positivism," the label "natural law" can confound as much as it
clarifies."' In constitutional theory, that confusion is particularly prevalent. For
instance, Professor Matthew Adler has cast Ronald Dworkin, whose relationship
with the natural law tradition is complicated at best, as the primary alternative
to positivist theories of constitutional interpretation.1 12 His later work briefly
addresses natural law in this context, albeit "in [the] simplest variant" of the
approach, which "equates law and morality." 1 3
We think the classical natural law approach, which predominated from the
time of the Romans to the late nineteenth century and remains vital (if misunder-
stood) today, merits engagement beyond "its simplest variant." The classical
108. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfred E. Rumble
ed., 1995) ("The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is
one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.").
109. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 4, at 2353 (arguing that "originalist judging can potentially be
justified on a much more straightforward and plausible normative ground-that judges have a duty to
apply the law, and our current law, in this time and place, is this form of originalism").
110. See Maris Kopcke Tintur6, Law Does Things Diferently, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 201, 211 (2010)
(review essay) (emphasizing "the moral need for law's positivity").
111. See Maris Kopcke Tintur6, Positive Law's Moral Purpose(s): Towards a New Consensus?, 56
AM. J. JURIS. 183, 213 (2011) (review essay) ("The important and potentially fruitful common threads
between 'natural law theories' and [more positivist approaches] only begin to emerge . . . once the
distracting quarrels about labels are set aside.").
112. Adler, supra note 34, at 196 & n.13.
113. Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1115, 1125 (2012).
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tradition, broadly stated, nests legal philosophy within the broader context of
moral and political philosophy. Human law, while a distinct and important
object of study and theorizing, is a practice and institution best understood and
shaped in light of those higher purposes that justify its existence in the first
place. 114
A more nuanced exploration will render the tradition more plausible than the
bumper sticker versions of natural law often bandied about in constitutional
discussion.1 1 5 It will also reveal substantial support for a more formal, re-
strained, and originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. This conclu-
sion will seem counterintuitive to many readers. Many associate natural law
with things like Justice Chase's purportedly antiformal opinion in Calder v.
Bull.' 1 6 By the same token, originalism's critics often identify its adherents with
positivism, and even moral skepticism, but not natural law.' 1 7 Such surprise is
in part due to constitutional scholars' seeming lack of interest in going beyond
familiar slogans about natural law.1 " A more careful look at this classical
114. See infra Section II.A. This is in contrast with the so-called modern tradition of natural law,
often associated with Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin, which does not offer an ethical theory with
implications for law, but rather prescinds from broader considerations and "narrowly [focuses on] the
nature of (positive) law." See Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: The Modem Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 61, 75-76 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
115. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 795 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
majority relies on "natural law" to override the original, founding law on sovereign immunity).
116. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (stating that "the general principles of law and reason"
constrain legislative power). We use the modifier "purportedly" because the Court decided the case
pursuant to a grant of appellate jurisdiction that limited review to certain questions of federal law. See
id. at 392; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. The Justices respected the
limits of that jurisdictional grant by separating the constitutional question they decided from
the exchange over "first principles" in dicta. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. On the constitutional
merits, Justice Chase's approach to interpreting the Constitution as a type of stipulated positive law was
entirely in line with his colleagues' approach and with the approach that prevailed for the next several
decades. See id. at 391-92 (exploring the "technical" and "acquired" meaning of "ex post facto laws");
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 578-84 (2003)
(describing how a course of practice fixed the meaning of "ex post facto" law to a narrower technical
sense prohibiting retrospective criminal laws rather than all retrospective laws).
117. See, e.g., ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 203 (1998) (stating
that originalist "interpretivism has become the modern face of legal positivism"); id. at 267 (describing
"originalism" as a "positivist reaction to the fundamental rights approach" of the Warren Court);
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Democracy, the Constitution, and Legal Positivism in America: Lessons from a
Winding and Troubled History, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1457, 1489 (2014) ("Edwin Meese III, President Ronald
Reagan's attorney general in the 1980s, announced the official conservative embrace of positivistic
originalism.").
118. For example, Richard Fallon disposes of "the natural law tradition" in a footnote after reducing
it to "the claim that an unjust law is 'no law at all."' Fallon, supra note 34, at 1126 n.69 (quoting ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-I, q. 95, art. 2, objection 4, reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE
& PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 132, 166 (2d ed. 1995)). No matter that the most prominent living
natural lawyer regards this purportedly central tenet of natural law as "pure nonsense, flatly self-
contradictory, or ... a dramatization of' a more subtle point about human law falling short of its moral
purpose. FINNIS, supra note 69, at 364; see also id. ("Aquinas carefully avoids saying flatly that 'an
unjust law is not a law: lex injusta non est lex. But in the end it would have mattered little had he said
just that.").
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tradition reveals a more complicated picture beneath such broad brushstrokes.
The tradition's appreciation of the moral value of positive law brings together
empirical, normative, and conceptual considerations for a unified theory of
originalist constitutional law.
A. CLASSICAL NATURAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Those working in the "natural law" tradition need to be specific about what
they mean. The classical natural law tradition we draw on concerns "the
requirements of practical reasonableness in relation to the good of human
beings who, because they live in community with one another, are confronted
with problems of justice and rights, of authority, law, and obligation." 1 9 This
concern is far broader than a neat equation of law with morality or an incanta-
tion of the nostrum that an unjust law is no law at all. As a tradition of moral
philosophy, natural law is also concerned with matters far broader than human
law. 12 0 Here, however, we are interested in what the tradition says about
justice's and morality's implications for the institution of positive law.
For our purposes, this narrowing is a good thing. People who describe
themselves as "natural lawyers" disagree about the nature and source of moral-
ity and justice, as well as their particular dictates. 1 21 And if we define the
tradition to include those who think morality and justice are matters of objective
truth, not mere opinion, the tent becomes even bigger. 1 2 2 Luckily for lawyers
like us, we can bracket some contentious questions big and small: "big" in that
we do not need to wade into metaethical debates about whether God is
necessary for morality, or how people come to learn truths about morality and
justice; "small" in that our argument does not have to resolve many particular
questions about morality and justice, such as whether capital punishment is
unjust, the proper extent to which government should redistribute income, or
whether bicameralism is a good thing. We are interested in middle-range
A notable exception is originalist Lee Strang. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian
Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1997 (2012) (offering a normative
defense of originalism grounded in the insights of virtue ethics); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of
Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006)
(deploying natural-law based reasoning to develop a framework for assessing precedent).
119. FINNIS, supra note 69, at 351.
120. See Bix, supra note 114, at 75 (noting how writers in the classical tradition of natural law focus
on developing a "general ethical theory" that has "implications for law and policy").
121. Even within one of the most prominent strains of natural law-the tradition building off the
work of St. Thomas Aquinas-John Finnis differs from scholars like Russell Hittinger on critical issues.
See, e.g., RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAw THEORY (1987) (criticizing Finnis).
Other self-identified natural lawyers work outside the Thomistic tradition that scholars like Finnis,
Hittinger, Jean Porter, and Alasdair Maclntyre dispute. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING
ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2000); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND
JUSTICE (1987); Stephen Macedo, The Inescapability ofNatural Law, in 5 BENCHMARK 117 (1993).
122. See Bix, supra note 114, at 64 (noting that identifying natural law theory with the belief that
"values a[re] objective and accessible to human reason ... might exclude very little"); cf Mark C.
Murphy, Was Hobbes a Legal Positivist?, 105 ETHICS 846 (1995) (No.).
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questions about why the natural law (objective morality and considerations of
justice within a reasonably wide range of theories) requires human communities
to develop legal systems and, given those reasons, how persons should respond
to those legal norms. 12 3
Accordingly, within the classical tradition there is much less disagreement
about the nature, purpose, and obligation of human law than there is about other
issues. 1 2 4 It is fair to say that a wide range of theorists in this tradition work
roughly from the presumption that law, as Aquinas defined it, is "an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community,
and promulgated."1 2 5 The particular inferences we draw about constitutional
interpretation from that tradition's insights on the nature and purposes of law
may be controversial, but we do not think the basic framework about law from
which we start is controversial. Or it is at least as uncontroversial as one can
hope for in a tradition embraced by figures as diverse as Plato, 12 6 Aristotle, 12 7
Cicero, 128  Augustine, 1 2 9  Aquinas, 1 3 0  Suarez, 1 3 1  Grotius, 1 3 2  Locke,
Blackstone, 1 3 3  Thomas Jefferson, 1 3 4  John Marshall, 1 3 5  Frederick
123. Cf Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REv. 633, 645 (1995) ("[W]e need a
theory concerning the enactment of positive law that will have ramifications for how we ought to view
such law: how it ought to be interpreted and what authority it should have in the community.").
124. For example, Thomists like Russell Hittinger and Jean Porter disagree with so-called "New
Natural Lawyers" like John Finnis on many metaethical questions, see generally HirINGER, supra note
121, but their understandings of law's nature and purpose coheres with much of Finnis's work in legal
theory, on which we will draw below. See, e.g., RUSSELL HirINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING
THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 63-91 (2003); JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A
NATURAL LAw THEORY OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 4-5 (2010).
125. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-I, q. 90, art. 4, at 208 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., William Benton 1952) (c. 1265-1273).
126. PLATO, THE LAWS bk. I, §§ 631c-631d (R.G. Bury trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1967-1968) (c.
348 B.C.E.).
127. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 7, 1134b-1135a (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
128. CICERO, ON THE REPUBLIC bk 3.33 (Francis Barham trans., Edmund Spettigue 1841) (c. 107-43
B.C.E.).
129. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine's Philosophy of Law, 18
AM. J. JURIS. 57, 73-79 (1973) (collecting sources and analyzing Augustine's understanding of the
relationship between human and natural law).
130. AQUINAS, supra note 125, pt. II-I, q. 90, art. 4, at 208.
131. FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS, AC DEO LEGISLATORE bk. 2, ch. 6, reprinted in 2 SELECTIONS
FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. (James Brown Scott ed., Gladys L. Williams, Ammi
Brown & John Waldron trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1944) (1612).
132. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. I, ch. 1, para. X (James Brown Scott ed.,
Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1925) (1646).
133. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38.
134. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (invoking "Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God").
135. See, e.g., ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 47-48 (1968)
(explaining that "Marshall followed his great teachers in insisting that civil society is ruled by the laws
of government, not by the maxims of nature as such," but that "[g]overnment's authority to suppress the
natural rights of men . . . appeared to the Chief Justice as but a regrettable necessity incidental to
government's fundamental purpose: preserving the natural rights of its own society's members so far as
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Douglass, 13 6 Jacques Maritain, 1 37 and (perhaps) Lon Fuller. 138
1. Law: Reason and the Common Good
The natural law tradition recognizes law as "an ordinance of reason for the
common good."1 3 9 Put another way, thinking about human law begins with the
recognition that there are certain goods that persons and communities can
achieve only by having authoritative legal institutions. To flourish, persons and
communities need to be able to protect the peace, coordinate their activities, and
cooperate on shared projects to promote the common good. Law is not the only
social institution that helps persons and communities develop their potentiali-
ties, but it can do things that solitary persons and other institutions cannot, at
least in a group of any size and complexity.
Accordingly, there is a moral need for positive law-law brought into being
by human choice or act. This moral need first requires antecedent, constitutional
decisions about how to structure a legal system. After that, officials working
within that framework must make further legislative and adjudicative choices
about what kind of rules that legal system will generate. The natural law
tradition, however, rejects the notion that there is some Platonic Form of a legal
system or consequent legal code that reason requires of every society. That
tradition, particularly as articulated by Aquinas, recognizes that practical reason
underdetermines questions about a legal order in general and many particular
questions to which law must speak. The natural law prohibits some legal rules
and may require others, but there are many more questions for which the natural
law does not dictate precise answers. 14 0 Even where the natural law speaks
clearly, the positive law must fill in details that are underdetermined by reason.
By "underdetermination," we mean that the natural law provides a framework
within which people can make reasoned choices, and bounds beyond which
possible"); id. at 68 (describing Marshall's views that "[i]n the deepest sense . . . it is nature as well as
the legislature which controls the judiciary's function; the judicial power is one special form of that
authority defined by 'natural public law"'). For a thoughtful discussion of Chief Justice Marshall's
belief in natural law principles and his reluctance to use them to supplement the positive law of the
Constitution, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the
Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal
Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 113, 122-31 (2003).
136. See David E. Schrader, Natural Law in the Constitutional Thought of Frederick Douglass, in
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: A CRITICAL READER 85 (Bill E. Lawson & Frank M. Kirklend eds., 1999).
137. See JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAw (Doris C. Anson trans., Gordian
Press, Inc. 1971) (1943).
138. Compare Bix, supra note 114, at 75-82 (treating Fuller as a "modern natural law" theorist
distinct from those like Finnis who work in the classical tradition), with Maris Kopcke Tintur6, Concept
and Purpose in Legal Theory: How to "Reclaim" Fuller, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 75, 77 (2013) (review essay)
(arguing that Fuller embraced the classical natural law tradition's emphasis "that law is best understood
by reference to its moral purpose").
139. AQUINAS, supra note 125, pt. II-I, q. 90, art. 4, at 208.
140. See id. pt. II-I, q. 95, art. 2 (stating that human law can be derived from natural law in a manner
likened to arts, where "common forms are determined to something particular; thus the craftsman needs
to determine the common form of a house to the shape of this or that house").
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they ought not choose, but no precise algorithm for making such choices. 141
Right reason, in short, does not precisely determine the right answer in all
places for all purposes. To take a simple example, even if the moral law requires
a human law against murder, it does not speak directly or categorically about
every element of the crime, degrees of culpability, available excuses and
justifications, and particular penalties. 142
The same holds for decisions about constitution-making. Given basic truths
about human persons, there are forms of government that no practically reason-
able person should choose. Given the particular context and history of a polity,
some forms of government that may be acceptable in some contexts may be
profoundly unreasonable in others. But there are many permutations of govern-
ing structures that fall within the range of reason and, given the imprecise
nature of judgment in human affairs, there will often be no way to demonstrate
with mathematical certainty that one is better than the others. 143
But it is important to make reasoned choices among the available options, for
the alternative of not choosing is itself unreasonable. Because unanimity is
impossible in all but the smallest, most homogenous groups, a political commu-
nity needs an institution to make authoritative choices and prioritize among
competing but reasonable alternatives about persons' rights and the commun-
ity's ends and means. Without authoritative enforcement of these legal norms,
cooperation and social coordination will be impossible, and the vulnerable and
the law-abiding will be subject to the stronger who reject the system. '4 The
practically reasonable person-the person of good sense about the requirements
of justice and morality-will therefore conclude that the polity needs a reason-
ably just and well-functioning legal system.1 4 5
2. Law: Promulgation by Those with Responsibility for the Community
The classical natural law tradition further defines law as something promul-
gated by those who have responsibility for the care of the community.1 4 6 This
latter half of the equation points to the importance of both authority and
positivity in law. Authority and positivity, of course, are frequently contrasted
with reason's pursuit of the common good.14 7 A reflection on law's moral
141. See generally John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON
LEGAL POSITIVISM (Robert P. George ed., 1996). This more modest approach contrasts with those that see
natural law providing more granular imperatives on the legal system. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process For-
mula, " 16 UCLA L. REv. 716 (1969).
142. FINNIS, supra note 69, at 282-83.
143. See generally id.
144. These norms may be fixed by codification or by an uncodified custom and shared understanding
sufficiently strong that codification is not necessary, as may well have been the case in the common law
courts at the time of Coke, Hale, and Selden. See infra Section II.A.2.
145. See generally John Finnis, The Law and What I Should Truly Decide, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 107
(2003).
146. AQUINAS, supra note 125, pt. II-I, q. 90, art. 4, at 208.
147. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946).
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purposes and benefits, however, reveals why posited, authoritative choice is
crucial for any political community.
Promulgation-the public fixing of legal rules-is central for law's moral
task. At the risk of stating the obvious, if a political community is to choose
among competing legal rules and priorities, its choices will be inert if citizens
and officials cannot identify them. To take an earlier example, the moral
injunction against murder only gets us so far without a more definite identifica-
tion of elements, defenses, penalties, etc. Similarly, the wisdom of having a
legislature or judiciary remains simply good advice without choices about
procedures, jurisdiction, and the like. If these choices are not fixed in durable
form, they simply remain good (or bad) ideas, not norms that provide guidance
and resolve disputes in the future. Accordingly, promulgation-the human act
that announces a chosen norm in a particular form-is critical for law to make
reasoned choices in furtherance of the common good.
This does not mean all law has to be codified, though Aquinas's writings on
law contemplate the model of a civilian legislator. It does, however, suggest that
the "central case" of law-law that does its job best-is likely to either be
positively promulgated or at least offer the benefits of promulgation. "Unwritten
law," such as common law doctrine, is positive in the sense that acts of human
choice-say, judicial decisions-differentiate these norms in important respects
from free-floating morality. 148 Common lawyers, for their part, think unwritten
law can provide much better practical guidance than the speculations of moral
philosophers. 14 9 If positive, uncodified law can provide the underlying benefits
of more formal promulgation, it can be desirable, particularly in the absence of
codified law.
Authority identifies those who have responsibility to make law-determining
choices for the community. Without settled rules concerning validity-whose
say-so counts for promulgating legal rules-the community is back to square
one, awash in a sea of competing normative statements. 1 5 0 Again, there can be a
wide range of reasonable constitutional arrangements for creating authoritative
148. See generally John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAw THEORY 51 (Douglas Edlin
ed., 2007) (identifying customary and precedential law as forms of positive law). We add the caveat "in
important respects" because we do think the interaction between moral and legal norms in unwritten
law is more complicated than the standard positivist description of adjudication. See 4 JOHN FINNIS,
Adjudication and Legal Change, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 397 (2011) ("Law has a
double life. It is in force as a matter of fact . . . . But it has its force by directing the practical reasoning
of those persons and groups. And [such] facts count in practical reasoning only by virtue of some
further, normative premise(s) . . . .").
149. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Law's System: The Necessity of System in Common Law, 2014
N.Z. L. REv. 69, 93 (explaining that common law "reasoning is public and practical, so it is meant to
serve the purpose of normative guidance of official and lay decisions and actions in and for a public").
Classical common lawyers contrasted the steady reason of the common law with that of "Casuists,
Schoolmen, [and] Morall [sic] Philosophers," whose judgments were prone to fall into "jangling and
Contradiction." Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe
[sic], reprinted in 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 500, 503 (1927).
150. See SCHAUER, supra note 88, ch. 10 ("Awash in a Sea of Norms").
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law: the natural law does not speak clearly or universally about parliamentary
versus presidential systems, unicameralism versus bicameralism, and the like.
But a polity does need to settle on a reasonable mechanism of authority for
making choices to promote the common good. Those criteria need to be clear so
officials and citizens can know what the law expects of them. And without these
discernible tests of validity, a community cannot reap the benefits of coordina-
tion, cooperation, and dispute resolution that a reasonably just legal system can
offer.
These considerations bring us to the intersection of law and morality. Law
and the state are not ends in themselves. They exist to promote human flourish-
ing and the common good. For that reason, the classical natural law tradition,
unlike legal positivism, maintains that there is a defeasible moral obligation to
follow the positively enacted laws of a reasonably just legal system. Were
officials and citizens to flout the positive law of such a system, the community
would lose the moral goods that law brings. Importantly, this obligation does
the most work when reason underdetermines a legal question. The natural law
on its own does not dictate the precise structuring of powers in a constitution or
the fair rate of return for regulated utility companies. But once positive law
weighs in, questions of moral indifference become matters of presumptive
moral obligation. The second-order moral reasons for law explain why the legal
authority of duly enacted, positive law imposes first-order moral obligations on
citizens and officials.
As noted, some legal choices can be beyond the pale. The obligation to honor
the positive law of a generally just legal system is only a moral presumption.
The strength of that presumption, what counts as a generally just system, and
how citizens and officials should act in the face of such injustice are questions
we bracket for now. That said, given the wide range of reasonable disagreement
on many questions and the moral benefits of authority, we think the presumptive
moral obligation would often have to be a strong one, particularly for officials
who maintain the legal system. Widespread, hair-trigger departures from the
positive law based on individual disagreement would quickly undermine the
legal system, and if the system were generally just, mass departures would thus
undermine the common good.1 5 1
151. In this respect, the classical natural law tradition resembles systems of so-called "ethical
positivism," which are based on rule-consequentialist arguments for legal authority. See, e.g., Tom D.
CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM (1996); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1993); Larry
Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985). This movement recalls the classical
approaches to legal positivism represented by Hobbes and Bentham, who were concerned not with
conceptual definition of law, but rather the normative benefits of law. See Dan Priel, Toward Classical
Legal Positivism, 101 VA. L. REv. 987 (2015). The primary difference between classical positivism and
the natural law tradition, in this respect, is at the level of metaphysical and moral theory: the natural law
tradition rejects utilitarian or consequentialist reasoning as the sole measure for thinking morally about
law and has a different conception of human persons and the knowledge available to them. See
Pojanowski, supra note 92, at 1024-25.
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3. Interpretive Implications for Constitutions
In Part I, we argued that the positive turn in originalism left unanswered two
critical questions about identifying and following the law: (a) whose internal
point of view matters in the context of legal disagreement and (b) why should
interpreters treat as normative any existing consensus about what the law is and
how to follow it. The natural law tradition's answers, and ours, to both ques-
tions focus on the central case of a legal system and the central case of the
practically reasonable person.
The natural law tradition tells constitutional framers and interpreters that a
community of persons needs a well-functioning legal system to flourish, and
that such a system needs ground rules for operating: a constitution. This moral
conclusion animates the work of practically reasonable framers and interpreters
alike. It instructs framers to make choices always informed by, but often not
definitely resolved by, moral reasoning about how to pursue the common good
through government. Further, the tradition's emphasis on promulgation suggests
that a written constitution supplemented by reasonably determinate unwritten
decisional rules is closer to the central case of law than entirely uncodified
conventions. A constitution's framers have a wide range of morally reasonable
choices available to them, but it is unreasonable for them not to choose and not
to convey those choices to the governed in the form of positive law.
A practically reasonable interpreter seeks to understand the reasoned choices
the framers made when enacting the positive law that constitutes the frame of
government. 152 Because of the second-order moral benefits of a functioning
legal system, the practically reasonable interpreter has a (strong) presumptive
moral duty to treat as authoritative and enduring the posited law of a reasonably
just legal system. This obligation holds for all within a jurisdiction, but it is
especially strong for those whose office requires them to maintain the governing
structure. Given the wide range of morally acceptable constitutional regimes
available to framers of a constitution, in many legal regimes there will be few, if
any, instances in which first-order moral reasons will trump an interpreter's
second-order obligation to enforce the positive law. This is so even if the
framers' choice is not one the interpreters would have made themselves.
While the previous discussion's abstraction is necessary to identify what an
ideal type of constitutional interpretation ought to look like, it is unmoored from
reality in important respects. This first cut of constitutional theory says nothing
in detail about how interpreters are to locate and derive the law of the Constitu-
tion, what to do in the face of constitutional silence, vagueness, or ambiguity, or
152. For a similar argument in connection with statutory interpretation, see EKINS, supra note 7, at
244-45 ("[I]n the central case of interpreting a statute interpreters will aim to infer and understand the
legislature's lawmaking intention, which intention (as expressed in the enactment) changes the existing
law in some way, a change which persists until it expires on its own terms or is amended or repealed by
a subsequent legislature.").
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what to do with incorrect, preexisting interpretations of the constitution. Mov-
ing from ideal type to concrete practice is not easy at all.
But even before we get to any of those complications, we first must explore
our actual, historical, posited Constitution. An argument like ours, which empha-
sizes the particularity of a polity's enacted law, must explore the connection
between the positivity of our Constitution and the classical natural law tradition.
Accordingly, we turn from the classical natural law foundations for written
constitutionalism in general to the classical natural law foundations for the
Constitution of the United States.
B. CLASSICAL NATURAL LAW FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
The framers practiced what classical natural law theory preaches. The basic
framework that we have sketched out to this point coheres with how our framers
thought about the positivity of our Constitution. Our recourse to the classical
natural law framework does not impose a theoretical import on our law, but
reintroduces our predecessors' framework for positive law to their posterity.
Evidence from the Founding and early practice under the Constitution reveals
that the Constitution was designed to be, and was understood to serve as, the
kind of stipulated positive law that classical natural law theory identifies as the
central case of positive law. It was made to be a fixed and authoritative legal
settlement of certain matters contributing to the common good of a complete
political community. The idea of American constitutional law as customary
positive law under a "living Constitution" did not emerge until the mid-to-late
nineteenth century. Before then, the positivity of our written Constitution was
prominently contrasted with the "unwritten," customary law English
constitution. 153
This Section reviews some of the most prominent evidence for the intended
fixity of the Constitution's authoritative legal settlements from the first several
decades. It begins with the Declaration of Independence, continues through the
Articles of Confederation and the framing of the Constitution, turns to argu-
ments over ratification, and concludes with evidence from early cases and
commentaries. It is not, and is not intended to be, a comprehensive survey. Such
a project would be more exhausting than illuminating with respect to the simple
claim that the Constitution was designed to be fixed and authoritative fundamen-
tal law.
153. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 91, 104-05 (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund
1999) (1803); see also Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795) (Patterson, J.)
(jury charge) ("[I]n England there is no written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible,
nothing real, nothing certain, by which a statute can be tested. In America the case is widely different:
Every State in the Union has its constitution reduced to written exactitude and precision.").
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1. The Declaration, the Articles, and the Constitution
We begin with first principles. The Constitution of the United States is a
human artifact; it was made and ratified by particular human beings over a
particular time to govern a particular political community. Over a decade before
the Constitution's ratification, the same political community purported to speak
in one voice in the Declaration of Independence. By means of the Declaration,
representatives acting "in the Name, and by Authority of the good people of
these Colonies" formally dissolved "all political connection between them and
the State of Great Britain," and formally assumed "among the powers of the
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them."1 5 4 This Declaration was an explanation of why it
had become "necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which
have connected them with another."1 5 5
While the people were one at this time, their governments were not.1 5 6 As
"Free and Independent States," each of "the united States of America" claimed
"full power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Com-
merce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of
right do."1 5 7 Over the course of the next decade or so, the people of each state
wrote and ratified state constitutions for their own states. 1 5  The Articles of
Confederation provided a confederate government. 15 9 But each state in this
confederacy retained "its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, which is not
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled."
The framers designed the Constitution of the United States to remedy the
defects of government under the Articles. Although separated from the nation's
birth by over a decade, the Constitution's making proceeded from the same
classical natural law premises articulated in the Declaration of Independence:
that "Governments are instituted among Men" to secure their natural rights,
"deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." 1 6 0
In these simple premises alone, one can already discern the positive-law
foundations of our constitutionalism. The Constitution of the United States, as a
human institution, would be granting powers to the new government it consti-
tuted. For those powers to derive from the consent of the governed, it would be
necessary for them to be understood; to be understood, the powers would need
154. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
155. Id.
156. See id. ("When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve
the Political Bands which have connected them with another. . . ."); Cf JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE
STATE 1-27 (1951) (distinguishing "the People" from "the State").
157. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S. 1776).
158. See TUCKER, supra note 153, at 104.
159. Article I of the Articles of Confederation provided that "The Stile of this Confederacy shall be
'The United States of America."' ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. I. Many of the self-imposed
limitations of State power are listed in Article VI. Id. art. VI.
160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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to be promulgated; to be promulgated, the powers would need to be specified
and communicated using language; and there would need to be some act or acts
of the people as the constituent authority signifying consent to the promulgated
powers.
The instrument the framers chose for securing the people's rights and confer-
ring the government's powers was a written Constitution that was to be legally
authoritative for future generations by remaining fixed until annulled or changed
in the proper way. This was the same kind of instrument that each of the states
chose in the wake of the Declaration of Independence. 16 2 Among the objects
designated by the Preamble of the Constitution is to "secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."1 6 3 The document declares "This Consti-
tution" to be the "supreme Law of the Land," and commands that those who
hold state and federal legislative, executive, and judicial office "be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."1 6 4
2. Publius & Brutus on Interpretation, Precedent, and Liquidation
Arguments about the Constitution during the ratification process reveal a
shared presupposition about the fixed nature of the proposed enactment. Writing
as Publius, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 explained the legally
binding nature of the Constitution as fixed until solemnly and authoritatively
changed: "Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, an-
nulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collec-
tively, as well as individually: and no presumption, or even knowledge of their
161. This summary is summary. For a more detailed elaboration, see GARY L. McDOWELL, THE
LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 225-51 (2010).
162. See, e.g., Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795) (Patterson, J.) (jury
charge describing Pennsylvania's Constitution) ("What is a Constitution? It is the form of government,
delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are
established. The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is
the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or
altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must
proceed from the same hand. What are Legislatures? Creatures of the Constitution; they owe their
existence to the Constitution: they derive their powers from the Constitution: It is their commission;
and, therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The Constitution is the
work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the
work or will of the Legislature in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of
the Creator, and the other of the Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative
authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is
the sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must
revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of
the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.").
163. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
164. Id. art. VI. For a comprehensive argument about the interpretive significance of "This Constitu-
tion," see Christopher R. Green, "This Constitution": Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist
Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009); see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127
(2003) (contending that the Supremacy Clause "establishes the text of the document-'this Constitu-
tion,' a written document-as that which purports to be authoritative").
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sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such
an act." 16 5
Putting the Constitution in writing was one of the ways in which the law of
the Constitution was to be fixed. But while fixing words in place gets one closer
to fixing law in place, fixing words is not always enough because words need to
be interpreted, and interpretations can vary. Even with the text of the Constitu-
tion fixed, constitutional law would remain subject to variation as long as
constitutional text was subject to variable interpretation.
Nobody thought that the Constitution answered every question about its own
interpretation or that the government it constituted could spring into operation
without the need for various adjustments and resolutions of unclear constitu-
tional matters. The general understanding was that there would be a process of
constitutional maturation and liquidation, as well as possible amendment, dur-
ing which the powers of the government, in all its parts and in their relation-
ships with each other, would be clarified and worked out.l"6 As Hamilton
explained in Federalist No. 82:
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish
the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; ... Time
only can mature and perfect so compound a system, liquidate the meaning of
all the parts, and adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent
WHOLE. 167
But maturation and liquidation were understood as distinct from amendment,
in that those processes would not change the Constitution itself; constitutional
amendments, by contrast, would.
Brutus, one of the proposed Constitution's most perceptive and farsighted
critics, seized on the recognized limitations of linguistic precision in law to
forecast dire predictions about how judicial interpretations of the Constitution
would extend the powers of the federal government and reduce the states to
insignificance. There are many strands to Brutus's powerful arguments. But our
focus at present hones in on his arguments about interpretive law and principles.
Brutus argued that the Constitution would be subject to both legal and
equitable interpretation.16" Legal interpretation would proceed according to the
known and generally uncontroversial rules for textual interpretation that pre-
vailed in the courts of law. 16 9 Equitable interpretation, by contrast, would follow
165. Alexander Hamilton, No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST 401, 406 (George W. Carey & James McLellan
eds., 2001) (1777-1778).
166. See Nelson, supra note 116, at 549-53 (describing the concept of constitutional liquidation with
reference to the Founding); Stephen E. Sachs, The "Unwritten Constitution" and Unwritten Law, 2013
U. ILL. L. REv. 1797, 1806-08 (same).
167. Alexander Hamilton, No. 82, in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 426.
168. Brutus, ESSAY XI (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 185, 187 (W.B.
Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds., 2002).
169. Id.
2016] 129
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
the principles of courts of equity, which gave greater latitude to judicial
interpreters to roam beyond legal text and decide according to the spirit of a
legal instrument. 170 Courts construing the Constitution, Brutus contended, would
deploy equitable interpretation.1 7 ' Given that one decision would become a
precedent for the next, expansive interpretations of federal powers would beget
further expansion, as both Congress and later judicial interpreters would join in
a process of gradual expansion. In this way, equitable interpretation plus
precedent would aggrandize the federal government and subvert the state
governments.
Publius responded that "there is not a syllable in the plan, which directly
empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the
constitution." 1 7 2 But Publius did not deny that the law courts would make use of
precedent. Indeed, one of Publius's arguments for the security of judicial
salaries and judicial tenure during good behavior rested on the need for judges
to use an ever-growing corpus of precedent. 17 3
It is less important at this point to figure out who was right than to recognize
the importance of what they were fighting about. The legal meaning of the
Constitution, Brutus and Publius recognized, depended not just on the text of
the Constitution but also on the law of its interpretation. And for them, there
was law of interpretation. They disagreed about which bodies of this law of
interpretation governed. But this, too, was a matter of legal disagreement to be
resolved by legal reasoning and argument.
More broadly, not just Brutus and Publius, but all opponents and proponents
of ratification realized the derivative importance of the law of interpretation
behind the constitutional text. That is why they argued about the powers and
structure established by the text. Even though opponents of ratification sought
to prevent the Constitution from going into effect until it was changed, they also
viewed textual amendments (or a different text altogether) as the right kind of
change for the various defects they saw in the plan.
3. Marbury v. Madison and Early Constitutional Commentaries
In early constitutional disputes resolved by the Supreme Court, the Constitu-
tion's writtenness underwrote the Court's obligation to treat the Constitution as
fixed law-indeed, as a law. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in
Marbury v. Madison1 7 4 is the now-canonical account of this relationship. In it,
Marshall describes a written constitution as "the greatest improvement on
political institutions," and he links the Constitution's writtenness to its capacity
to bind in the future:
170. Id.
171. Id. at 188-90.
172. Alexander Hamilton, No. 81, in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 165, at 418.
173. Hamilton, supra note 165, at 407. This precedent would be about all manner of law. Publius
does not single out constitutional law.
174. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose
are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained? 175
In describing the kind of law that the Constitution is, Chief Justice Marshall
posited that the Constitution is "either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or ... on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like
other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."1 7 6 In
endorsing the former, Marshall appealed to the intention of "all those who have
framed written constitutions" to make "the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation," and he declared that "the theory of every such government must be,
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." 1 7 7 This
"theory," said Marshall, "is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is
consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of our society."1 7 8
Only after this statement of fundamental principles did Marshall turn to the
"peculiar expression[] of the constitution of the United States," that is, to the
particular language of the Constitution itself rather than fundamental principles
attached to all written constitutions. 1 7 9 And he concluded that review of the
Constitution's language, as well as the opinion itself, by observing that "the
particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument."ISO
Marshall's views on the Constitution were not shared by everyone in his time.
This is particularly so regarding Marshall's understanding of the scope of the
national government's powers as set forth in later cases like McCulloch v.
Maryland."" But Marshall's understanding of the Constitution's positivity and
fixity was widely shared. 18 2 Whatever the particular substantive disagreements
among first and second generation constitutionalists, their shared agreement
about the positive-law character of the Constitution is what matters for our
purposes.
175. Id. at 176, 178.
176. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 178.
180. Id. at 180 (first emphasis added).
181. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
182. See McDOWELL, supra note 161, at 250 (describing "general agreement among the founding
generation that when it came to interpreting their new constitution there had to be rules . . . [making it]
the duty of the judge to find the original intention of the lawgiver or the constitutional framer").
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Marshall's opinion in McCulloch has often been mistakenly marshaled against
the idea of a fixed Constitution. 18 3 In the course of sustaining congressional
power to charter the Second Bank of the United States, Marshall famously
wrote that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."1 8 4
Against those who would demand express and minute specifications of every
legislative power for the federal government, Marshall explained that the
Constitution's nature required "that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."'1 5 Later interpret-
ers have taken Marshall's statement about the level of specificity to expect from
the Constitution's enumeration of legislative powers to stand instead for the
idea that the Constitution itself changes. 1 6 Understanding Marshall's statement
in this way, however, is unfaithful to his opinion, which explains that the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be given a meaning that would enable the
government to deal with dimly seen or entirely unforeseen exigencies.18 7 As
Justice Scalia explained, "[t]his argument rests entirely upon the premise that
the interpretation given today must be adhered to. Otherwise, there would be no
need to bear in mind the 'exigencies of the future'-which could be met by
saying, . . . 'Well, our notions of what the Constitution permits have changed.'"188
This misunderstanding of McCulloch is not new. Some critics of McCulloch
when it was handed down charged the Marshall Court not only with adopting an
overly broad understanding of federal power, but also with treating the Constitu-
tion like a "mere thing of wax," and twisting it into a shape that was not
intended.18 9 While rejecting the charge of having disfigured the Constitution,
Marshall recognized that the criticism of treating the Constitution as judicially
changeable was serious-a criticism that, if accurate, would be devastating. His
pseudonymous newspaper defenses of McCulloch, accordingly, defended not
only the decision itself, but also the Supreme Court's right to authoritatively
decide questions of constitutional law.190 And he did so by resting this right to
183. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 581, 595-96 (1989-1990).
184. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
185. Id.
186. See Scalia, supra note 183, at 594 ("[T]his old chestnut ... is often trotted out, nowadays, to
make the point that the Constitution does not have a fixed meaning-that it must be given different
content, from generation to generation, retaining the 'flexibility' needed to keep up with the times.").
187. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 ("This provision is made in a constitution, intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have
prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers . .. would
have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all,
must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.").
188. Scalia, supra note 183, at 596.
189. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 141 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
190. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, Letter IX (July 14, 1819), reprinted in JOHN
MARSHALL' S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V MARYLAND 207, 209 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
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decide on the permanency and writtenness of the Constitution, declaring this
"great American principle, the judicial right to decide on the supremacy of the
constitution, a right which is inseparable from the idea of a paramount law, a
written constitution."1 9 1
Early treatise and commentary writers made a similar move in describing the
Constitution as fixed and authoritative fundamental law. 192 Writing in 1803, St.
George Tucker, a Jeffersonian Republican with views contrary to positions the
Marshall Court later adopted, linked the Constitution's writtenness with its
fixity. By means of a written constitution, Tucker wrote, "government was
reduced to its elements; its object was defined, its principles ascertained; its
powers limited, and fixed; its structure organized; and the functions of every
part of the machine so clearly designated, as to prevent any interference, so long
as the limits of each were observed."1 93 The American Revolution, according to
Tucker, gave birth to the phenomenon of written constitutionalism as a way of
rendering "familiar to every intelligent mind" the distinction between sover-
eignty (which resided in the people) and government. 194 He contrasted our
written constitution with England's unwritten constitution: "The boasted consti-
tution of England, has nothing of this visible form about it; being purely
constructive, and established upon precedents or compulsory concessions be-
twixt parties at variance."1 95
In 1822, Pennsylvania lawyer Thomas Sergeant completed his project of
"reducing to system, the principles and practice of our National Jurisprudence,
of tracing them up to their constitutional source, and of exhibiting in a succinct
manner, the general origin, and uniform harmony, of the whole."1 9 6 Sergeant
wrote in this commentary that the "basis of the government is, that the people
191. Id.
192. In using the phrase "fundamental law," we do not mean here to adopt or take any position on
the claim that the Constitution is not "ordinary law" like the rest of law that courts deal with in
nonconstitutional cases. See, e.g., Sylvia Snowiss, The Marbury of 1803 and the Modern Marbury, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 231, 232-33 (2003) (describing this distinction). That claim bears on how and by
whom the Constitution is to be authoritatively interpreted. As proponents of this distinction acknowl-
edge, practice under the Constitution led to the assimilation of the Constitution into judicially
enforceable law. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 163-64 (2001) (describing "a change from viewing constitutions as a special kind of
fundamental law outside the regular legal system to seeing them as a species of ordinary law subject to
conventional rules of legal interpretation and precedent").
193. TUCKER, supra note 153, at 104.
194. Id. ("The American revolution seems to have given birth to this new political phenomenon: in
every state a written constitution was framed, and adopted by the people, both in their individual and
sovereign capacity, and character. By this means . . . government was reduced to its elements; its object
was defined, its principles ascertained; its powers limited, and fixed; its structure organized; and the
functions of every part of the machine so clearly designated, as to prevent any interference, so long as
the limits of each were observed. The same reasons operated in behalf of similar restrictions in the
federal constitution.").
195. Id. at 105.
196. THOMAS SERGEANT, Preface to CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A VIEW OF THE PRACTICE AND JURISDIC-
TION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED (2d ed. 1830).
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have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles
as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness."1 97 "These
principles," Sergeant asserted, "are fundamental and designed to be
permanent." 98
Writing a few years later, William Rawle linked the "fixed and settled" nature
of the Constitution to the judicial authority to declare a law unconstitutional.
"Where there is not a fixed and settled constitution, whether written or unwrit-
ten, which cannot be altered by the legislature, the judiciary has no power to
declare a law unconstitutional." 99 Rawle described this feature of judicial
authority as an essential aspect of the Constitution's appeal to "the minds of
freemen, to whom was submitted the consideration of a scheme of government,
professing to contain those principles by which a future legislature and execu-
tive were to be regulated." 2 0 0
In his Commentaries on American Law, published in the same decade,
Chancellor Kent linked the authority of the judicial department to rule on the
constitutionality of a statute to the Constitution's status as paramount and
permanent. "The Constitution is the act of the people, speaking in their original
character, and defining the permanent conditions of the social alliance," wrote
Kent, "and ... every act of the legislative power contrary to the true intent and
meaning of the constitution, is absolutely null and void." 2 01 Kent praised an
independent judiciary as "peculiarly fitted for the exalted duty of expounding
the Constitution," thereby protecting "every part of the government and every
member of the community from undue and destructive innovations upon their
chartered rights."202
Consolidating the Marshall Court's legacy in his 1833 Commentaries on the
Constitution, Justice Joseph Story set forth rules of constitutional interpretation
drawn from general principles and from the course of constitutional adjudica-
tion over the past few decades.2 03 Among other things, Story rejected arguments
from "policy" or "convenience" on the ground that such arguments would
subject the law to fluctuating meanings.2 04 Such fluctuations were unsuitable for
the kind of law that the Constitution is, Story wrote: "It is to have a fixed,
uniform, permanent construction. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity
will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but
the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." 2 0 5
197. Id. at 266.
198. Id.
199. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 274 (2d ed.
1829).
200. Id. at 275.
201. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 449 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896).
202. Id. at 450.
203. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Melville M. Bigelow
ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 5th ed. 1994) (1891).
204. Id. at 326.
205. Id.
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We could multiply authorities and evidence, but to what end? The idea that
the written Constitution's legal settlements-whatever else they were-were
fixed until properly changed was itself a fixed point around which constitutional
contestation occurred. The deep substantive disagreements among the Constitu-
tion's interpreters over the Constitution's first several decades were contained
within a broader shared agreement that the written Constitution sets forth fixed,
supreme law binding all subject to it.
The most significant conceptual change in American constitutionalism from
then to now has been the rise of the idea that ours is a living Constitution. This
living Constitution has not killed the dead Constitution, but the two existing
side by side has led to great confusion and variety in today's legal culture. As
the next Section explains, we live in a time of constitutional eclecticism. The
manner in which the Supreme Court now develops constitutional law is compat-
ible to varying degrees both with the idea of the Constitution as stipulated,
written positive law (the right way of thinking about it) and also with the idea of
the Constitution as customary, unwritten positive law (the wrong way of
thinking about it). But these foundational understandings of the Constitution are
not compatible with each other as master concepts for the kind of positive law
that the Constitution is.206
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ECLECTICISM WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS CUSTOMARY LAW
Interpretive eclecticism is ascendant in contemporary constitutional case law,
and has been for some time now. This eclecticism arose as originalism col-
lapsed, for no architectonic idea of constitutional law has since ruled alone.
Originalism has been replaced not by a new idea but by an institution. Nothing
symbolizes this transformation better than the Supreme Court building itself.
Completed in 1935, this temple to justice under law opened just as the old
orthodoxy of originalism appeared almost obsolete. And the guiding principles
issuing forth from the Supreme Court have been anything but consistent or
clear.
The originalism that collapsed was not as theoretically refined as originalisms
are today because originalism then was to constitutional law what water is to
fish. Whatever their particular disagreements, lawyers and jurists generally
agreed on the kind of law that the Constitution is: "a discrete act of lawmaking
by discernible lawmakers."2 07 Contrast this understanding of constitutional law
with that implicit in the case method by which constitutional law is taught
today. Students learn to understand constitutional law as the product of discrete
acts of lawmaking that take place when Supreme Court Justices vote and write
206. See Waldron, supra note 123, at 650 ("There is a massive difference-in substance, ethos and
rhetoric-between a positivist jurisprudence dominated by an image of customary law and a positivist
jurisprudence dominated by an image of legislator's law.").
207. Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the
"Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 192
(1997).
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opinions to explain those votes. In this sense, originalism has not collapsed as
much as it has migrated from originalism about the Constitution to originalism
about Supreme Court case law.
The eclecticism in constitutional case law is evident from an examination of
any handful of constitutional law cases in the U.S. Reports. If there were some
deeper unity to be found beneath the pluralistic surface, one would expect that
law school courses in constitutional law would help one identify and understand
an accepted way of elucidating what is really going on. Yet that is not to be
found. The standard course in constitutional law consists largely of serial study
of Supreme Court decisions. Students learn how to carry on with constitutional
interpretation by observing how the Supreme Court carries on. And this experi-
ence of oracular observation is unedifying. Some formalism; some functional-
ism. Which do you think is right? Some originalism; some living
constitutionalism. Which makes more sense to you? Some stare decisis, and
then some more, except when not. What gives? And thus this pedagogy
cultivates cynicism as students see constitutional law change with public opin-
ion and the composition of the Court. Some scholars tell us this is exactly as it
is and, perhaps, as it should be. 2 08 For students, Judge Posner's observation
resonates: "If changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is." 2 0 9
It was not always this way. The case method was not widely used in law
schools until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 2 10 The first
"Constitutional Law" casebook did not arrive until 1895.211 Before then, the
predominant way students learned constitutional law was through treatises and
lectures based on those treatises. 2 12 Commentators aiming for comprehensive-
ness could not avoid matters of first principle, such as what kind of law the
Constitution was. This was both virtue and vice. For first principles matter, and
there were deep disagreements about some of the most fundamental. Is the
Constitution a compact among the states? 2 13 How to determine the existence
208. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (using history and political
science in an attempt to dissolve the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty); Corinna Barrett Lain,
Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 179-83 (2012) (examining the normative implica-
tions of judicial review that is more representative of majority will than the political branches).
209. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 1 (2008).
210. See generally Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory
History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IowA L. REv. 547 (1997).
211. JAMES B. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1895); see also Jay Hook, A Brief Life of
James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1993) (describing Thayer's constitutional law
casebook as the first).
212. Even though academic legal settings were not the principal means of educating new lawyers
until the twentieth century, the point stands. Novice lawyers who learned by "reading law" would still
have largely received their exposure to constitutional law through treatises and digests rather than
through reading cases.
213. Compare, e.g., TUCKER, supra note 153, at 104, with RAWLE, supra note 199, at 295-97.
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and scope of implied powers? 2 14 These were among the many basic questions
that divided early commentators.
By the late nineteenth century, appeal to an unwritten constitution had
emerged as a way of dealing with these complexities. Mechanical imagery gave
way to organic, and change was seen as evolutionary adaptation rather than
corruption. 15 One might not be able to trace principles back from the cases to
the Constitution through legal reasoning, but one could nevertheless see their
emergence and evolution by using "the genetic method." 2 16 Hence the study of
cases as the primary materials for understanding constitutional law.
Treatises remain available to students today, and often end up being more
relied-upon instructors of students than their casebooks. Students widely regard
Chemerinsky's work as the best single-volume treatment of constitutional law
to accompany them in their studies.2 17 As a collection of local histories for
dozens of doctrines, Dean Chemerinsky's tome is hard to top. But if familiarity
with Supreme Court doctrine has not bred contempt, something else has fueled
deep dissatisfaction. Dean Chemerinsky's latest book is The Case Against the
Supreme Court, in which he argues that "[t]he Supreme Court has largely failed
throughout American history at its most important tasks and at the most
important times." 2 18
And then there is Professor Laurence Tribe. The treatise tradition in Ameri-
can constitutional law reached a symbolic end of sorts with Tribe's decision not
to complete the second volume of the third edition of American Constitutional
Law.2 19 His self-professed inability to make full sense of contemporary constitu-
tional law in the treatise format reflects the pluralism of the subject matter more
than the analytic and synthetic capacities of the author. The first volume of the
third edition identified seven different models of the Constitution and spelled
out the cases contributing to two such models over the course of almost 1,400
pages.2 20 One can only wonder at how extensive an exposition would have been
required to fill out the remaining five models. But in the presence of plural
starting and ending points and ways of moving there and back, over and over
and over, what else would a treatise writer attempting not only to guide, but also
to describe, constitutional law be expected to do?
214. Compare, e.g., STORY, supra note 203, bk. III, ch. 5, with ABEL P. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: BEING A REVIEW OF JUDGE STORY'S COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 101-02 (Alethes Press 2007) (1840).
215. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY- SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY 65-96 (1992) (explaining the latter part of the nineteenth century as the age of the
unwritten constitution).
216. 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, at v (Cambridge, Charles W. Sever,
1895).
217. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (4th ed. 2011).
218. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Supreme Failure, POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/09/the-supreme-court-has-failed-111450 [https://perma.cc/839J-94J2].
219. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005).
220. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (3d ed. 2000).
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And so we trudge on with our edited cases and answerless queries, typically
leaving for a separate "constitutional theory" course consideration of jurispruden-
tial foundations (or their absence). In today's constitutional law classroom, the
idea of a right way of thinking about the Constitution as law is quaint. There is
only better and worse for various purposes. The conclusion of almost all
constitutional arguments contains premises adopted as a matter of instrumental
choice or ideological preference among rationally underdetermined alternatives.
In the meantime, constitutional law remains assimilated jurisprudentially into
the category of customary positive law, as it has been since the latter part of the
nineteenth century. One gets along by adopting the habits of the natives,
including their habits about arguing about what their practices ought to be.
Constitutional law is not so much made as it is the byproduct of these argumen-
tative practices. And while the Supreme Court lurches from case to case, the rest
of us struggle to stave off cynicism and constructively engage the bloated
corpus of constitutional law. 2 2 1
To understand the Constitution as law, one needs a theory of the lawfulness
of constitutional law. Simple acceptance is not enough; acceptance precisely as
law is necessary. The classical natural law foundations of our Constitution
provide one such account. The next Part explains in more detail what accep-
tance of the Constitution as stipulated positive law built on such foundations
would look like.
III. TOWARD ENDURING ORIGINAL-LAW-ISM
Having reviewed the natural law foundations for positive law generally
(Section II.A), the classical natural law foundations of our positive-law Constitu-
tion in its origin and early development (Section II.B), and the constitutional
eclecticism of the present (Section II.C), we now look forward. In particular, we
explain how the classical natural-law tradition supplies the jurisprudential
foundation for original-law originalism or original-law-ism as an account of our
law of the Constitution today.
There are three parts. First, we explain how the original law of the Constitu-
tion relates to interpretive conventions appropriate for the kind of law that it is.
Second, we explain why original-law-ism will endure for as long as the concept
of our Constitution as stipulated positive law endures. And third, we explain
why original-law-ism remains attractive as long as the ongoing judicial and
popular revolution against it remains unresolved.
221. Cf Steven D. Smith, What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret?, in EXPOUNDING THE
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 21, 37 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008) ("[I]t seems
undeniable, first, that there is no consensus about what we are interpreting when we do constitutional
interpretation and, second, that the practice of constitutional interpretation rolls along anyway-rolls
along exuberantly, confidently, and sometimes with exalting or devastating consequences for the
various institutions and individuals who find or place themselves in its path.").
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A. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF ORIGINAL-LAW-ISM
The previous Part draws on the classical natural law tradition to explain and
justify a conception of a constitution as posited law that merits moral obliga-
tion. To recap briefly, we argued that tradition grounds individual obligation to
the law of a polity in the moral need for positive law-law brought into being
by human choice or act. 2 2 2 Promulgation-the human act that chooses and
announces a norm in particular form-is critical for law to effectuate reasoned
choices in furtherance of the common good.2 23 Moral agreement and custom
will not be sufficient for coordination, cooperation, or dispute resolution in a
society of any complexity. Positive law that is fixed until changed by agreed-
upon procedures is necessary to facilitate individual and communal flourishing.
Authority identifies those who have responsibility to make law-determining
choices for the community. Without settled rules concerning validity-whose
say-so is efficacious for promulgating legal rules-the community is back to
square one, awash in a sea of competing normative statements. 22 Because of
the second-order moral benefits of a functioning legal system, the practically
reasonable interpreter has a (strong) presumptive moral duty to treat as authorita-
tive and enduring the positive law of a reasonably just legal system. 2 2 5 A
practically reasonable interpreter therefore seeks to understand and respect the
reasoned choices the framers made when enacting the positive law that consti-
tutes the frame of government.
The first order of business, then, is specifying just what the positive law of
our Constitution is-what exactly an interpreter seeks to understand and re-
spect. We begin with the original law of the Constitution as a function of the
text and interpretive conventions appropriate for the kind of stipulated positive
law that the Constitution is. We then turn to more detailed consideration of the
legal obligation to liquidate and settle the legal meaning of the Constitution in
order to achieve legal fixation that endures over time.
1. Text as Law, and Law as a Function of Text
The text of the Constitution is law, but the law of the Constitution is more
than the text. It is a function of the text together with other law, as well as all
other conventions through which the text of a written legal instrument of this
sort would have communicated legal meaning at the time of enactment. As with
any other enacted law, the law of the Constitution-its rules, directives, and
other principles-is not mere statements found in its text, but the propositions
which are true, as a matter of law, by reason (a) of the authoritative utterance of
those statements taken with (b) the bearing on those utterances and statements
(and on the propositions those utterances were intended to make valid law) of
222. See supra Section II.A.1.
223. See supra Section II.A.2.
224. See supra Section II.A.2.
225. See supra Section II.A.3.
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the legal system's other, already valid propositions.2 2 6
The Constitution's ratification originated a new government for the United
States-in fact, a new kind of government.22 7 Rather than inaugurating a legal
Year Zero for all purposes, however, the Constitution emerged out of, and
maintained substantial elements of continuity with, an existing legal system.2 28
The Constitution introduced significant changes, such that straightforward appli-
cation of preexisting legal backdrops will not always be possible. Yet that
preexisting legal system provides the coherence-giving context for understand-
ing the Constitution as foundational for the new law and the new institutions of
the government it created. The Constitution, moreover, was written in a particu-
lar language, such that its legal meaning, which is a particular kind of conven-
tional meaning, also depended on the linguistic conventions of the time.
2. How to Interpret a Legal Instrument Like Our Constitution
Because the original law of the written Constitution was a function of the text
together with interpretive conventions (both legal and linguistic), the content of
this original law depended on what those conventions were. And immediately
we run into a difficulty: which conventions made the original law of the
Constitution what it was?
As Caleb Nelson has documented, there were some conventions that all
seeking the original law of the Constitution would use, whereas others were the
subject of legal disagreement. 2 2 9 The law provided different sets of interpretive
conventions for different kinds of legal instruments. 2 3 0 For instance, statutes
were to be interpreted one way, contracts another, and treaties yet another way.
So what kind of legal instrument was the Constitution? "[T]he world had
never before encountered a written constitution for a federal system based on
226. See 4 JOHN FINNIS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 18-19 (2011).
227. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All The Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 161 (2015) (book
review) (arguing that the Constitution "brought forth something new under the sun").
228. The Constitution contrasts with the Napoleonic Code, which purported to abolish all preexist-
ing law. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE Civw LAw SYSTEM 14 (2d ed.
1977) (describing this aspiration); Sachs, supra note 56, at 1821 ("[T]he Founders didn't declare a legal
Year Zero, nor did they repeal and replace all prior law. Compare this to the work of the codifiers in
post-Revolution France: the Code Napoleon effected a general abrogation of ancient laws, in which any
rules remaining outside the Code would provide no basis for overturning a judgment." (internal
citations omitted)). The signature page of the Constitution as an instrument proposed by the constitu-
tional convention, by contrast, not only includes conventional dating from the birth of Christ but also
from the Declaration of Independence. See U.S. CONST. attestation cl. ("Done in Convention by the
Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States of America
the Twelfth.").
229. Nelson, supra note 116, at 555 ("[C]ertain kinds of linguistic and legal conventions unquestion-
ably bear on what all originalists think of as the Constitution's 'original meaning.' Even within that
core, though, members of the founding generation could reasonably disagree about exactly which
interpretive conventions the Constitution triggered.").
230. Id.
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the American concept of popular sovereignty." 2 31 Even if an off-the-rack set of
interpretive conventions were part of the original law of the Constitution, which
set was it? And why assume that just one set should be used? Did different parts
of the Constitution call for different interpretive conventions? Was it necessary
to develop new conventions? "Could special canons of construction, not appli-
cable to any ordinary legal documents, be derived from the Constitution's
unique context and purpose? If so, what were those canons? The answers to
these questions were far from clear, and members of the founding generation
expressed a variety of different views."23 2
Deep disagreement over what belonged in the set of interpretive conventions
for the Constitution directly related to deep disagreement over the nature of the
Constitution as a legal instrument. But in this direct relationship there was, and
still should be, an important area of agreement: how to identify the positive law
of the Constitution depends on what kind of legal instrument the Constitution is.
Agreement on this relationship explains why, for example, Joseph Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution are organized as they are.233 The rules for
interpretation that he set forth were founded on the concept of the Constitution
as a legal instrument that he defended.
Story's Commentaries begin with a history of the colonies and an account of
the revolution and the confederation, before turning to the Constitution of the
United States.2 34 The first two chapters on the Constitution concern the adoption
of the Constitution and objections to it. 2 3 5 Story then examines the "[n]ature of
the Constitution,-[w]hether a [c]ompact," using his reasoning and conclusions
from that portion to explain why the Supreme Court of the United States is the
final judge or interpreter in constitutional controversies. 2 36 Only at this point is
Story finally in a position to set forth "[r]ules of [i]nterpretation" of the
Constitution.2 37 In seeking to explain how to interpret the Constitution as law,
Story needed to argue from an account of what kind of law the Constitution is.
Our point here is not to say Story captured and arranged the existing
conventions with precision, although he is a central source. Our critique of
purely descriptive approaches entails that normative argument must enter the
picture, either to sort out conflicting positions or to give reasons for continuing
with any coherent practice we find. 2 38 But Story's Commentaries provide more
than just credible data points. His approach is emblematic of the kind of
argument that can lead to reasoned agreement about interpretive conventions. If,
231. Id.; see also Lash, supra note 227, at 161.
232. Nelson, supra note 116, at 556.
233. See STORY, supra note 203.
234. Id. bk. I-III.
235. Id. bk. III, ch. 1-2.
236. Id. bk. III, ch. 3-4.
237. Id. bk. III, ch. 5.
238. See supra Section I.B.
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as we have argued,239 the Constitution is the kind of law that is supposed to be
fixed and enduring, then it needs to be interpreted using conventions that lead to
fixed and enduring law.
As long as disagreement about the nature of the Constitution as a legal
instrument persists, a shared understanding of what to argue about in arguing
for a particular set of interpretive conventions is not enough to enable identifica-
tion of a full set of interpretive conventions for the Constitution. There will be
no normative lens through which to filter conflicts between interpretive conven-
tions. But insofar as there is agreement on some of this legal instrument's legal
qualities, there can be agreement on some of the interpretive conventions
appropriate to it.
3. Fidelity to Original Law, Lawful Liquidation, and Interpretive Conventions
Revisited
A Constitution is only as fixed and enduring as the legal conventions and
mechanisms sustaining it. Insofar as the original law of the Constitution re-
solves legal questions within its domain, a legal convention requiring adherence
to that meaning until lawfully changed suffices to make the law fixed and
enduring. 240 But insofar as the original law of the Constitution underdetermines
legal questions within its domain, the system needs legal conventions for
rendering the law sufficiently determinate.
The framers' law of the written Constitution provided one such device,
namely the idea of "liquidation." Liquidation is a process by which judges or
other government officials settle practically underdeterminate new law by adopt-
ing one permissible interpretation rather than another.2 41 A lawful liquidation
satisfies two conditions. First, the preliquidation law of the Constitution must be
underdetermined; liquidation cannot unsettle that which was already estab-
lished. Second, the postliquidation determination of the law of the Constitution
must be within the range of permissible preliquidation underdeterminacy that
exists after application of other appropriate interpretive conventions.24 2
A lawful liquidation is a lawful change in the law of the Constitution. Even
though liquidation of the Constitution changes the law of the Constitution, such
changes are consistent with-indeed, necessitated by-the concept of the Consti-
tution as fixed, authoritative, and enduring until lawfully changed. Once liqui-
dated, a legal meaning that was previously just one possible legal meaning
239. See supra Section II.B.
240. Other features of the legal system, such as stare decisis, may require an interpreter to adhere
not to the original law, but to an entrenched unauthorized departure from original law. We will discuss
that possibility below. See infra Section III.B.2.
241. See supra note 166.
242. Cf Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (2001) (analogizing between
Chevron's recognition of reasonable uncertainty in statutory provisions and the interpretation of unclear
constitutional text).
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243
among many becomes fixed in the law of the Constitution.
Constitutional liquidation is not a matter of conceptual necessity or a logical
entailment of any written constitution. One could imagine a constitutional
regime in which all indeterminacies remain zones of unfixed legal discretion,
open to revision in the way modern administrative law considers interpretive
gaps in statutory regimes or the way some common law courts consider
precedent. That kind of constitutional regime might reject liquidation as an
interpretive convention.2 44
But our enacted constitution, with its particular features of fixity and endur-
ance, favors liquidation. Lawful liquidation improves the Constitution as the
kind of law that it is by authoritatively settling something previously unsettled.
Liquidation is continuous with the kind of constitution we have as a matter of
original law and for reasons the framers had for conceiving of our Constitution
as that kind of legal instrument in the first place. Just as an original constitution
framer makes choices inspired by, but largely not determined by, the natural
law, a subsequent, liquidating interpreter works within the confines of settled
constitutional law to make more determinate the matters that legal frame raises
but does not settle. And just as a polity can only reap the moral benefits of that
posited constitutional framework when it is enduring, so must lawful liquida-
tions be as enduring as the original, determinate law.
The same moral benefits of law's positivity that animated the enactment of
our Constitution as a whole point toward permanent legal fixation of unresolved
parts. The framers' law of the written Constitution included the idea of liquida-
tion. Accordingly, to the extent liquidation was a contested convention, a
practically reasonable interpreter of the Constitution and its historical context
should come down in favor of lawful liquidation. And, to the extent that
liquidation was an uncontroversial matter at the Founding, liquidation's coher-
ence with our Constitution and its underlying justifications gives the practically
reasonable interpreter strong reasons to continue to respect the practice and its
addition to our original constitutional law.
Admitting liquidation into the interpretive fold does more than provide for
settlement with respect to uncertain provisions of the Constitution. Liquidation
offers defenders of original-law originalism means for resolving uncertainty
about interpretive conventions. As Nelson has noted, liquidation "can be applied
to disagreements about interpretive conventions no less than to disagreements
about the meaning of individual words." 5 As the law unfolded, this process of
liquidation did take place. By the 1830s, the Supreme Court had largely arrived
243. Here the analogy to Chevron, as traditionally conceived, see supra note 242 and accompanying
text, breaks down. Whereas an agency may have discretion to later reverse its resolution of statutory
uncertainty, see, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), fixation of constitu-
tional law through liquidation is enduring.
244. That said, given the moral benefits of positive law, we would counsel interpreters to embrace
liquidation in the gaps to the extent the constitutional settlement permits it.
245. Nelson, supra note 116, at 556.
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at a set of interpretive conventions, which can be seen in Story's Commentar-
ies. But our constitutional culture had not fully settled on a single complete
set of interpretive conventions. After all, compact theory was alive and well
until the end of the Civil War. 7
Yet we should not underestimate the amount of agreement, either. "From the
time of the founding throughout the nineteenth century, there was a consensus
in court opinions and legal treatises that judges were obligated to interpret the
Constitution on the basis of the original meaning of constitutional provi-
sions."" The interpretive conventions that became applicable to the Constitu-
tion were more similar to those applicable to a statute than to a treaty or a
contract or a will, but also included some that were distinctive to the Constitu-
tion. And although the Marshall Court expounded the Constitution in a manner
that provided for greater federal power than compact theory would have al-
lowed, everyone agreed that the Constitution should be interpreted based on its
original meaning as "a discrete act of lawmaking by discernible lawmakers."249
Nelson argues that a commitment to originalism does not entail a commit-
ment to liquidation; whether an originalist should understand liquidation as
legally required depends on one's normative reasons for being an originalist.25 0
Still, this framing oversimplifies matters by describing liquidation as a tech-
nique that one adopts for normative reasons external to the law. To be sure, our
adherence to the Constitution's original law flows from the classical natural law
tradition's emphasis on positive law's moral benefits. That commitment, how-
ever, requires us to honor the kind of constitution the framers and ratifiers
enacted. Favoring interpretive conventions that resolve and fix uncertainty is
internal to the logic of a document that (reasonably) was framed to be fixed and
durable. In that respect, all of the interpretive conventions that make the
Constitution the kind of stipulated positive law that it was are themselves
legally required.2 51 Liquidation is one such convention.
4. Original Law, Liquidated Law, and the Rest of Constitutional Law
What about the rest of constitutional law? Our analysis so far identifies two
categories of law that comprise the law of the Constitution: original law and
liquidated law. The original law of the written Constitution is a function of the
text together with interpretive conventions, both legal and linguistic. Liquidated
law is the authoritative resolution of questions within the scope of the original
law, but not clearly answered by that same law. A lawful liquidation selects an
246. See STORY, supra note 204.
247. "Compact theory" refers to the collection of ideas surrounding the understanding of the
Constitution as a compact with the states as the contracting parties.
248. Gillman, supra note 7, at 192.
249. Id. at 192-93.
250. Nelson, supra note 116, at 549-50.
251. Just as, for example, the interpretive convention of construing a contract to effect the intention
of the parties is legally required in contract law as we understand it.
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answer within the range of interpretive reasonableness and, once fixed, is as
entrenched as the original law of our written Constitution.
We can consider original law and liquidated law as the "Law of the Constitu-
tion." But the Law of the Constitution does not exhaust constitutional law.
There is a category of legal propositions that are not directly derived from the
Law of the Constitution which, for lack of a better term, we will refer to as
"Other Constitutional Law." This category has three components. First, there
are authorized developments of doctrine that are consistent with the fixed Law
of the Constitution, even though they are not required by or derived directly
from its legal content. Second, there are unauthorized developments of doctrine,
which seek to implement the Law of the Constitution as the type of fixed,
positive law it is, but happen to get that law wrong. Third, and most worrisome,
are unauthorized departures. These are legal propositions that arise from, and
seek to instantiate, an understanding of the Constitution as a different kind of
legal instrument than the stipulated positive law that it is.
We examine these categories below, but the following figure clarifies our
explanatory scheme.
Figure 1: Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law
The Law of the Other Constitutional LawConstitution
Text and Liquidated Authorized Unauthorized Unauthorized
Conventions Law Developments Developments Departures
Depending on one's other commitments, this category of Other Constitutional
Law may include constitutional constructions (as described by Keith Whitting-
22 253ton,252 Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, 2 5 4 and others), implementing doc-
trines (as described by Richard Fallon 2 5 5 ), decision rules (as described by Mitch
Berman 2 5 6 ), and other categories of doctrine for enforcing the Constitution as
law. Unless one is a thoroughgoing judicial supremacist, according to which the
Law of the Constitution just is whatever the Supreme Court says it is, there will
always be some divergence between Other Constitutional Law and the Law of
the Constitution.
Without diving deeply into the details of any particular doctrine, it is not
possible to determine which propositions in this Other category fall into which
252. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL MEANING (1999).
253. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. PoL'Y 65
(2011).
254. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REv. 453 (2013).
255. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
256. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 (2004).
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slot. That said, examples of propositions of constitutional law that are not the
Law of the Constitution are: the rule that content-based speech restrictions are
generally subject to strict scrutiny; rational basis review of economic regulation;
intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications; the undue burden test for
abortion restrictions; the rule that allows for aggregating effects of economic
regulation in review of legislation purportedly authorized by the Commerce
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause; the Dole test for conditional spending
legislation; and so on.
All of these doctrines are judge-made law for implementing the Constitu-
tion. 2 5 7 Yet it is difficult to understand any of them as interpretations of the
constitutional text even though they are traceable in some way to textual
interpretation. In this respect, authorized implementing doctrines are different
from liquidated law. 2 58
A full account of authorized implementing doctrines rests on an understand-
ing of "[t]he judicial power of the United States"259 vested in the federal
judiciary and a theory of constitutional adjudication. From the perspective of
the classical natural law tradition, the manner of justifying a theory of constitu-
tional adjudication is similar to the one that we use for justifying the Law of the
Constitution. But the analysis pertains not only to the text of the Constitution
positing the "judicial power of the United States," but also to jurisdictional
grants and all other positive law that defines and bounds the judicial power.
We do not offer here a theory of constitutional adjudication. But our account
of the Law of the Constitution and the classical natural law foundations for
positive-law originalism has important implications for such a theory. The most
obvious are those that follow from distinguishing between the Law of the
Constitution and the rest of constitutional law. The moral and legal authority not
only of the outputs of constitutional adjudication, but also of the doctrinal
inputs of much constitutional law require distinct and additional justification
from that offered for the Law of the Constitution.
5. Unauthorized Departures from the Law of the Constitution
Although we do not here offer a full account of what justifies authorized
developments of doctrine, our account of the Law of the Constitution can
identify at least some unauthorized developments and departures. That is to say,
our account of the Law of the Constitution leaves much of constitutional law
unjustified on its own, but it opens up into justifications for much of the rest of
257. See FALLON, supra note 255, at ix (focusing "attention on the role of Supreme Court Justices as
practical lawyers, charged with implementing the Constitution" by "developing .. . workable doctrinal
structure[s]" that give legal effect to constitutional meaning but are not fully determined by it).
258. Cf., e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules:
Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010) (distinguishing legal
interpretation from the construction of decision rules).
259. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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today's constitutional law and condemns other aspects of today's constitutional
law as unjustified.
The aspects of today's constitutional law our account most strongly con-
demns are unauthorized departures-legal propositions justified by appeal to the
Constitution as a different kind of law than the stipulated positive-law legal
instrument that it is. This category of unauthorized departures includes legal
propositions following from interpretive approaches that treat the Constitution
as customary positive law. The law emerging from custom and the law emerg-
ing from an enactment are both forms of positive law, but the interpretive
conventions appropriate to deciding cases on the basis of each are different.
Treating positive law that renders constitutional questions determinate via
stipulation as an evolving matter of judicial custom unmoors the resulting law
from the jurisprudential framework within which it was justified.
It is important to identify this legal category of unauthorized departures as
resting on a changed master concept of the Constitution as law. For some years
now, our culture of constitutional interpretation has included many who believe
(and act) as if "there's no realistic alternative to a living constitution."26 0
Professor David Strauss, a leading academic proponent of "the living Constitu-
tion," explicitly contrasts its purported "common law" workings with a system
built "on an authoritative, foundational, quasi-sacred text like the Constitu-
tion." 2 61 For the common law living constitutionalist, "provisions of the text of
the Constitution are, to a first approximation, treated in more or less the same
way as precedents in a common law system." 2 6 2 The "characteristic" move of
constitutional adjudication in such a system is "extending precedent in the
direction that seems to make more sense as a matter of morality or good policy,"
even when this means that textual provisions only "function[] as sources of
inspiration."263
A stopped clock is right twice a day, and constitutional reasoning premised on
a defective concept of the Constitution as law may yield legal propositions that
happen to square with the Law of the Constitution. One cannot refute a
conclusion of constitutional reasoning simply by identifying its link with a
defective master concept of the Constitution. But unauthorized departures should
put the practically reasonable interpreter on high alert. Unless and until justified
by reference to the Law of the Constitution, doctrines of constitutional law that
rest on unauthorized departures do not possess the same moral or legal authority
as doctrines developed on a foundation of the Constitution as fixed, authorita-
tive, stipulated positive law. Pedigree matters.
It can sometimes be difficult in practice to distinguish between unauthorized
departures and authorized developments of doctrine. It is the rare federal judge,
260. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010).
261. Id. at 3.
262. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1,
4-5 (2015).
263. Id. at 6-7.
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after all, who asserts that "[t]he notion that the twenty-first century can be ruled
by documents authored in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries is non-
sense." 264 That "nonsense" is our law. And judicial opinions almost always keep
up appearances.
Even so, it is not difficult to recognize that much constitutional law today is
developed without regard for whether it is authorized by the Law of the
Constitution. "In the modal Supreme Court constitutional decision," Strauss
notes, "the text of the Constitution plays no real role at all."26 5 The text of the
Constitution serves a "ceremonial role, bows out, and the serious analysis
focuses on the precedents."26 6 Rather than treat the Constitution as stipulated
positive law and apply the interpretive conventions appropriate to the kind of
legal instrument that the Constitution is, judges and other officials rely on
"precedents and policy arguments to reach a conclusion that may or may not be
the most straightforward reading of the text." 2 6 7
In this context, the distinction between unauthorized departures and autho-
rized developments of doctrine serves two important functions even when the
line between the two categories is unclear. One is to explain why the "ceremo-
nial role" of the constitutional text persists. Judges and others who claim to
speak for the Constitution must go through the ceremony of purporting to
interpret the constitutional text to at least preserve the appearance of authoriza-
tion by the Law of the Constitution.
A second function of this distinction is prescriptive. Observers can often
distinguish between opinions that "rea[d] the text in the single best way" and
those that "read the text in a way that accommodate[s] [a particular] result."26 8
The distinction between authorized developments and unauthorized departures
explains why the best reading of the text beats-or should beat-the result-
accommodating reading. The best reading of the text is that which supplies the
Law of the Constitution; conformity with the Law of the Constitution is what
authorizes constitutional law.
Unauthorized departures are not the only way that constitutional law can go
wrong. There are unauthorized developments-doctrines that start from the
premise that the Constitution is fixed, authoritative, stipulated positive law, but
just get the law wrong. We focus on unauthorized departures here, though,
because a defective master concept of our Constitution as customary positive
law influences much of today's constitutional law. That influence is a key re-
ason why our taxonomy of constitutional law matters. It provides an orientation
for choosing among internal points of view by highlighting the relationship
264. Richard A. Posner, Eighteen Years On: A Re-Review, 125 YALE L.J. 533, 541 (2015) (reviewing
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED
COMMITMENT (1996)).
265. Strauss, supra note 262, at 8.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id. at 11.
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between the what of the Constitution and the how of its interpretation and
implementation. The practically reasonable interpreter should adopt the internal
point of view appropriate to the kind of legal instrument that the Constitution is.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND ENDURING ORIGINALISM
Our analysis so far has focused on originalism as a theory of law rather than
as a theory of legal epistemology or adjudication. By setting the Constitution's
positivity on firmer foundations than casual, nontechnical positivism, our ac-
count explains how the Law of the Constitution endures even while it undergoes
some lawful changes. This is a distinctive contribution of our explication of the
classical natural law foundations of our positive-law Constitution.
The prior Section explained that how one understands the positive law of the
Constitution depends on what kind of positive law the Constitution is. This
Section builds on that insight by explaining the relationship between our
account of the Constitution's positivity and the continuity of our constitutional
order. This explanation provides an anchor against the drift that threatens to
carry away advances made by other theorists of the positive turn in originalism.
And it grounds an explanation for the persistence of other originalisms as well.
The best explanation for the endurance of originalism in practice, we con-
tend, is the endurance of the idea of the written Constitution as fixed, stipulated
positive law. Some version of constitutional originalism will always be attrac-
tive for interpreters as long as the Constitution is widely enough understood
as the kind of legal instrument that it was designed to be-superior law
authoritatively fixed until lawfully changed. This recognition is a second payoff
of understanding the classical natural law foundations of our positive-law
Constitution.
1. Enduring Original Law
The distinction between the Law of the Constitution, unauthorized depar-
tures, and authorized developments of doctrine secures the relative permanency
of the Law of the Constitution. To maintain continuity with the original law of
the Constitution, lawful changes in the Law of the Constitution must be
consistent with fixed, authoritative, and enduring law, like the original Law of
the Constitution was designed to be.
As long as this conception of the Law of the Constitution endures, legal
actors have available a potentially winning argument based on it. This argument
could take the form of restoring the Law of the Constitution after there has been
an unauthorized departure. Or it could take the form of bringing an authorized
development of doctrine into closer alignment with the Law of the Constitution.
In one sense, both kinds of arguments are for law reform. But in another sense,
they are arguments for making constitutional practice better align with what the
law already is.
To grasp this point, consider an "easy case" of getting the Constitution
wrong. The Constitution requires the President to be at least thirty-five years
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old. 2 6 9 To simplify, let us assume that there are just two possible legal meanings
of this provision. One is "chronological age": Anybody who has been around
fewer than thirty-five years since birth is ineligible to be President. The other is
"mental age": Anyone with the maturity of an average thirty-five-year-old is
eligible to be President despite a chronological age lower than thirty-five. 2 7 0 Let
us further suppose that the correct legal meaning fixed as an original matter is
"chronological age." That is the law.
Now suppose the Supreme Court interprets the age requirement to mean
"mental age" instead of "chronological age." What's the law then? Can those
made newly eligible by this ruling legally be President?
"Mental age" is the law if even erroneous interpretations of the Constitution
give rise to law of a certain sort. And they do, although the precise nature of this
law is a matter of some dispute. 2 71 According to the standard view of vertical
stare decisis, Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law bind lower
federal courts and state courts deciding questions of federal law. 27 2 Like it or
not, then, these courts are stuck with "mental age" until the Supreme Court
changes its mind. Supreme Court decisions also carry some legal weight
through the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis. Again, the way this works is a
matter of some dispute.27 3 But it is enough for present purposes that a Supreme
Court decision adopting "mental age" gives rise to law of a certain sort. The
Supreme Court can alter that law by a later decision. But unless and until
the Supreme Court changes course, those newly eligible under the "mental age"
approach can legally be President as far as the federal courts are concerned.
The example is not done yet, though. For "chronological age" is also the law
even while "mental age" is the law that will be applied in federal courts. The
fixed meaning of the written Constitution remains law of a certain kind even if
269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Theorists familiar with the literature attacking the very idea of the
so-called "easy case of the under-aged President" may worry, "Here we go again." See, e.g., Anthony
D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 250 (1990). But have no fear. Nothing in our analysis takes issue with Michael Moore's conclusion
that "there are no easy applications of rules to facts, and hence, no easy cases." Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 292 (1981). Our analysis is only about identification of
the law.
270. More details are unimportant. Whatever the precise meaning, it is enough for the example that
the set of eligible people under "mental age" has at least some different members than the set of eligible
people under "chronological age."
271. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503,
505 (2000) (describing the law created by precedent as a species of federal common law).
272. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail
within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal
courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."); see also Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 824-25
(1994); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994); Randy J. Kozel,
The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 203 (2014).
273. See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1843 (2013) (discussing the relationship between precedent and theories of constitutional
interpretation).
150 [Vol. 105:97
ENDURING ORIGINALISM
the Supreme Court ignores it or casts it aside. This persistence as positive law of
a sort may seem counterintuitive, but it is real. If the Supreme Court were to
overrule its "mental age" case and go back to "chronological age," one could
accurately speak of the Court as having returned the law to what the law was all
along. The decision bringing "chronological age" back to the federal courts
brought the case law back in line with the enacted law. 2 7 4
To say that "mental age" and "chronological age" are both the law when one
is the law in constitutional practice and the other is the law in the Constitution
itself is not to indulge a flight from constitutional positivity. When Supreme
Court case law deviates from the enacted law of the written Constitution, there
are two kinds of positive law in play. The enacted law of the written Constitu-
tion remains positive law of a sort even when dormant as a matter of Supreme
Court case law.
True, the enacted law of the written Constitution is not "the law" insofar as it
deviates from Supreme Court case law . .. if by "the law" we mean just the law
that should be applied in courts until the Supreme Court changes its tune. But
why use "the law" in such a narrow sense? This way of thinking is certainly
useful in some contexts and for some purposes-maybe even most of the time
and for most purposes. But there is more constitutional law in our constitutional
universe than in the U.S. Reports. This remains true even when two proposi-
tions of law claim to occupy the same constitutional space. Indeed, our law not
only includes conceptual resources for recognizing the coexistence of inconsis-
tent constitutional rules, but it also has a rule of formal priority: the Constitution
is superior law to what the Supreme Court (or anyone else, for that matter) says
about the Constitution.2 75
By analogy to property law, the enacted law of the written Constitution has
superior title even when the case law of the Supreme Court is in possession.
This is not to say that enacted law always trumps case law in formulating rules
of decision. Formal priority does not always dictate preeminence in practice.
Just as a party with superior title cannot always regain possession, the enacted
law does not always fully occupy the case law. But a mismatch between
superior title and actual possession is not reason to collapse the concepts into
each other. Neither does our constitutional order collapse the Constitution into
what the Supreme Court (or Franklin D. Roosevelt, or any other individual or
institution) says. There is no adverse possession in constitutional law.
274. In contrast, if "mental age" had first become law via textual amendment, and then a later textual
amendment changed it back to "chronological age," we could not accurately describe the restorative
amendment as one that brought back what the law really was all along. That would be crazy talk.
275. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . .
(emphasis added)).
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2. Constitutional Continuity While Restoring the Law of the Constitution
Constitutional law today includes unauthorized departures from the Law of
the Constitution and regularly develops based on considerations other than the
law of the written Constitution. But our constitutional order maintains fundamen-
tal continuity as long as there remains some fidelity to the concept of the
Constitution as stipulated, fixed positive law that interpreters should approach
with interpretive conventions proper to such a document.
This foundation for constitutional continuity sets our account apart from
Baude's positive-law argument for originalism. Baude grounds continuity in
official practices of acceptance, but without explaining his choice among inter-
nal points of view. Consider, for example, the Noel Canning decision.27 6 Even
though parts of Justice Breyer's opinion "read like a contentious victory of
pragmatism over originalism," Baude observes that the opinion only empha-
sized practice after finding the text to be "ambiguous."27 7 In this important
respect, Baude explains, the Noel Canning majority refused to adopt the litigat-
ing position advanced by the Obama Administration's Solicitor General, who
argued that longstanding practice can prevail even over clear text.2 78 This
Administration view, Baude says, apparently is not the law. 2 7 9
But what if a majority of the Supreme Court had not only acted as if
longstanding practice could be decisive, but also explicitly said in Noel Canning
that longstanding practice can prevail over clear text to the contrary? Baude's
casual positivism lacks the conceptual resources to label such a departure
unauthorized as long as the departure is officially accepted. If pragmatism
explicitly triumphs over originalism at the Supreme Court, then pragmatism is
the law. In our view, however, the internal point of view of even a Court
majority that would allow practice to prevail over clear text is defective in
comparison with an internal point of view committed to the preservation of the
Constitution as the kind of fixed, authoritative, and enduring stipulated positive
law that it was designed to be. That is the original central case of the internal
point of view for our constitutional order.
The continued availability of this internal point of view grounds the continu-
ity of our constitutional order. This internal point of view enables one to argue
that when (and insofar as) the Law of the Constitution is not the law in practice,
the Law of the Constitution should be taken off the shelf, returned from exile,
substituted in from the sidelines, or whatever you like. That law is still our law
in theory, even if not in practice, and the jurisprudential role of a fixed,
authoritative, enduring, stipulated positive-law Constitution in our legal system
authorizes an interpreter to say "so much the worse for practice."2 80
276. Baude, supra note 4, at 2372-74 (citing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)).
277. Id. at 2372-73.
278. Id. at 2374.
279. Id.
280. Sachs, supra note 16, at 2254.
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Sachs has explained how shared higher order legal principles can overcome
erroneous applications of those shared principles in practice, such that original-
ism can be the law even when it is in exile. 281 But Sachs also ultimately rests
the continued availability of originalism in our law on "facts about our society
today." 28 2 He argues that "if it is true, the claim that we adhere to the Founders'
law is the best reason to be an originalist-and, if it's false, the best reason not
to."
2 8 3
We agree that the case for originalism is contingent on continued adherence
to the concept of our Constitution to which it is attached. But that continued
adherence depends on choice and cannot be resolved by reference to social facts
alone. In our constitutional order, a fixed, authoritative, enduring, stipulated
positive-law Constitution is not the only official story on offer. The question
remains whether the practically reasonable interpreter today should continue to
adhere to the original central case of the internal point of view for our
constitutional order.
C. THE PROBLEM OF ENDURING ORIGINAL LAW
Thus far we have provided an account of what the Law of the Constitution is
and how it relates to our constitutional law. The taxonomy we have offered
provides a powerful, normatively charged, legally grounded account of our
constitutional law. Although this taxonomy provides a hierarchy of law that is
helpful for resolving particular questions of constitutional law as they present
themselves today, it does not provide an algorithm. Nor do we proceed to offer
one here.
Some may view this as a cop-out. It is not. Consider a powerful objection to
our account based along the following lines: "Your account of constitutional
law is interesting, and it might even be persuasive if we were living in the
1790s. But the ship of state has sailed and we've been out to sea for so long that
the Law of the Constitution cannot be our navigation chart any more. Everyone
knows this, including the Justices of the Supreme Court. That is why they, and
we, accept the reality of constitutional change outside of Article V's amendment
process. You should too."
To answer this challenge based on acceptance of change over time, we need
to put aside enduring originalism as a theory of what our constitutional law is
(for better or worse) and focus instead on enduring originalism as a superior
theory for identifying valid, controlling, and fully binding constitutional law
today. Should the practically reasonable interpreter of our Constitution endure
as an original-law originalist today? That is a hard question, and we begin by
rejecting two easy answers.
281. See id. at 2256.
282. Sachs, supra note 1, at 829.
283. Id. at 822.
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The first easy answer is: "Yes. The practically reasonable interpreter should
follow the law. Because the Law of the Constitution is the original law of the
Constitution plus any lawful changes since then, the way to identify the law is
to be an original-law originalist."
Unfortunately, it is not that easy. Today there is more constitutional law than
the original law of the Constitution plus any subsequent lawful changes. Con-
sider nonoriginalist precedent. This precedent, at least on the conventional
account that we do not question here, binds lower court judges, is a permissible
source of law for Supreme Court Justices, and is a framework for everyone else
to order their affairs. This nonoriginalist constitutional law is not a lawful
change to the Law of the Constitution, but it is law nonetheless. When the Law
of the Constitution and the law in nonoriginalist precedent are both law, the
practically reasonable interpreter whose only guidance is "follow the law" will
be at a loss.
Often, however, there is even more law to consider and that law frequently
points toward nonoriginalist precedent. Stare decisis principles, the law of
remedies, and preclusion doctrine are all part of our law. And this law can
require or at least make it more practically reasonable to follow bad constitu-
tional law instead of good. The effect varies among practically reasonable
interpreters. A lower court judge is more constrained than a Supreme Court
Justice. A government official subject to an almost immediate injunction if she
flouts an erroneous Supreme Court precedent is more constrained than the
author of a law review article that criticizes that precedent. And so on.
To the question of whether to endure as an original-law originalist, then, the
next easy answer is: "No. Just be a pragmatic conventionalist. Follow whatever
the law happens to be in a nontechnical, casual positivist sense. When this
points in different directions, do whatever makes the most sense, all things
considered. Do not be seduced by cosmic constitutional theory."
Without further specification, however, this is no counsel at all. To know
"what makes the most sense, all things considered," one needs an account of
what our constitutional law is and what makes that law the best it can be. And
on the best account, there very well may be no single best choice in "hard
cases." If that is the case, then any theory purporting to provide a method for
getting the one right answer is wrong.
Given the variety and complexity of our law, the real question facing the
practically reasonable interpreter who recognizes original-law originalism as a
way of identifying the law is not whether to follow original law plus any lawful
changes, but how and when. Whatever original-law originalism picks out as law
is law, but it is not the only law. Because the output of original-law originalism
is law, it may be available for adoption as the law to govern a particular case.
Whether it is depends on what other law may be on point.
Even though our defense of enduring original-law-ism does not provide
granular guidance in particular cases, the perspective it offers is theoretically
valuable. And the decision whether to adopt that perspective is practically
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significant. Consider by analogy a natural law argument against the American
Revolution. One could make the case that, given the positive goods that a
reasonably just government offers, violent rebellion against the British Crown
was practically unreasonable. 28 4 But that interesting and arguably correct argu-
ment became beside the point once the new settlement was conclusively
established. You can reject the nostrum that one must break eggs to make
omelets while still concluding that sometimes eggs, once broken, cannot be
unscrambled. Similarly, one could argue that even if the departure from original-
law originalism was practically unreasonable, it is our settlement now. And the
moral benefits of positive law requires us, as natural lawyers, to defend that
reasonably just, if imperfect, Constitution.
But while our constitutional order roils with conflicting interpretive currents,
it has not yet reached a sea change. Sophisticated theorists of the living
Constitution and of moral readings of the Constitution are correct to identify
ways in which the constitutional order has fundamentally transformed. And they
are correct that these transformations are discontinuities from the original-law
originalism so prevalent in the first century of our constitutional order. But the
last time scholars tried to write originalism's obituary, it took on new life. The
Court in United States v. Lopez28 5 and National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius 28 6 brought the limits of the Commerce Clause closer to the
Constitution's original law without overruling a single case. Originalist readings
of the Second Amendment, Confrontation Clause, and the Jury Clause claim
fidelity to the original law, even if that meant modifying doctrine.2 87
Originalism-understood as fidelity to the Constitution as stipulated positive
law-is not yet dead. It is not as ascendant as advocates of the positive turn
claim, but its legal force is nonetheless real. Accordingly, the interpretive
revolution that seeks to depart from the understanding of the Constitution as
stipulated positive law is not complete. This contested state of affairs still offers
a live choice between original-law-ism and living constitutionalism. Unlike the
case with 1776 Revolution, it is not idle to argue the Tory side. But, like the
case with the 1776 Revolution, ordinary legal argument can only press the case
for positive constitutional continuity so far.
At the risk of being tarred and feathered, we maintain that the practically
reasonable legal interpreter should hold onto the stipulated positive law the
Constitution introduced into our system, except as changed by means that same
law provided. The burden to justify departing from settled, positive constitu-
tional law is a heavy one because of the moral benefits of positive law. And we
are not convinced that the original law posited at the time of the Founding is so
284. Cf John Keown, America's War for Independence: Just or Unjust?, 6 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT
277 (2009) (unjust).
285. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
286. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
287. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2016] 155
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
unreasonable as to merit noncompliance.28 8
The legal alternative to original-law-ism is not no-law-ism. There will con-
tinue to be constitutional law without enduring original-law-ism, primarily
in the form of judicial decisions. These decisions will in some sense be inspired
by the Constitution and its "values," and will be responsive to contemporary
needs and values. The model of the "living constitution" authorizes ongoing,
usually incremental, judicial constitutional lawmaking and reframing. But in
framing constitutional rules and structures, as we've argued, there is frequently
no geometrically correct answer from the perspective of first-order political
morality. So if there is to be constitutional law, as opposed to an ongoing,
uncertain, and often cacophonous judicial seminar on constitutional structure
and individual rights, subsequent interpreters will have to treat those decisions
as settled. One substitutes original-law-ism for subsequent-law-ism.
Even if you are not going to be originalist about the original Constitution,
you end up being an originalist about something-here, subsequent decisions
developing Constitution-inspired common law. A moment's reflection on the
general dissatisfaction with the Court's unstable, unclear, and sometimes incoher-
ent constitutional doctrine points to the challenges of promulgating a constitu-
tion primarily through adjudication. The wide range of governing arrangements
that reasonable interpreters and framers can and do disagree on, the multiple
modalities of interpretation ever on offer, the mysteries of identifying "the law"
via the common law method, and the uncertain threshold about when to revisit
what law one has found all suggest that the fault for uninspiring constitutional
law lies not as much with the Justices' abilities as with the nature of the task to
which the Justices have applied them. Adherence to original law, when avail-
able, can provide a clearer metric for deciding which interpretations are better
than others.
Put another way, the choice between originalism and living constitutionalism
is a referendum on the framers' and ratifiers' (codified, settled, and reasonable)
choice in favor of a written constitution with explicit and implicit closure rules
over something more closely resembling the inherited British practice of unwrit-
ten constitutionalism. As a first-order matter, the classical natural law tradition's
focus on promulgation suggests a preference for fixing constitutional law in
canonical, reasoned, and systematic text.289 Thus, even if it is legitimate to
rethink our constitutional order, the practically reasonable (re)framer should
hesitate before moving our foundational law further away from the focal case of
constitutional law. No posited constitution can resolve all questions, but the
impossibility of an ideal type hardly justifies further steps to depart from it.
288. To be sure, the present interpretive pluralism undermines the benefits of settlement, but
allowing that form of uncertainty to change the balance loads the dice in favor of those seeking to
destabilize continuity.
289. Cf EKINS, supra note 7, at 125 ("Public promulgation and canonical formulation [in legislation]
make the legal change easier to locate and grasp than that found in unwritten custom or in the best
understanding of a line of cases.").
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And it is important to be clear about the stakes of abandoning the Constitu-
tion as the original law its positors understood it to be. Perhaps, contrary to our
argument, we should abandon treating the original Constitution as stipulated
positive law and regard it as inspirational material for law that develops through
adjudication to meet contemporary needs and values. If so, the official exposi-
tors of our new constitutional order need to be as honest about this practical,
legal discontinuity as its academic advocates. Such honesty might make it more
difficult for our new framers to invoke the original Constitution's settlement-
and to cloak themselves in its majestic mantle-while saying a new kind of
dynamic constitution now resolves vexed disputes about individual rights or the
common good. Reflection on the goods of positive law, moreover, demands that
advocates of living constitutionalism face up to the moral burden of ensuring a
clear and durable framework for social coordination and cooperation. Having
studied and taught the Court's efforts to develop such a framework outside and
beyond the original law, we wish them luck. Or, rather, we wish they would
instead devote their energy and ingenuity to identifying and applying whatever
original constitutional law there is on such matters.
CONCLUSION
Our original Constitution still matters. This Constitution was made, not born.
It is a legal artifact posited by particular people, enacted into law over a
particular period, and amended at particular times. Amendments aside, its text
has remained unchanged even while the very concept of the Constitution as
fixed, authoritative, enduring, stipulated positive law has faced sustained as-
saults in the past hundred years.
A constitution of customary positive law is different in kind from a constitu-
tion of stipulated positive law. Whether one calls this customary constitution a
living constitution or something else is unimportant. But if one is to accept that
framing, as some of its champions advocate, the biggest problem that opponents
should have with living constitutionalism is not that it treats the Constitution as
living. The real problem is that living constitutionalism switches the soul of our
Constitution from one that approaches immortality to another that dies and is
reborn every day. The Constitution is dead, they say; long live the Constitution!
In classical thought that runs from Aristotle through Aquinas, the soul is the
form of the body. As its form, the soul animates the body and makes it the kind
of thing that it is. Keep the body and switch the soul, and you have a different
creature entirely. This soul-swap is what proponents of a living Constitution
have been trying to accomplish with the Constitution of the United States of
America. For over a century now, living constitutionalists have aimed to infuse
the body of the Constitution-its written text-with a new animating principle.
By revealing the relationship between the Constitution's jurisprudential soul
and its textual body, we show how this soul-swap transforms the Constitution so
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fundamentally as to make it no longer the kind of law that it was at the origin.
Maybe the living Constitution is better than the written Constitution; maybe not.
But they are different creatures.
There are some who say now, as some have been saying for a generation,
that originalism is dead or dying. But originalism is not dead. What looks like
originalism dying is better understood as the Constitution losing its soul.
Originalism will not die, but will endure, as long the Constitution keeps its soul.
And nonoriginalists will have to keep enduring originalism.
